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  INTRODUCTION   
Tragically, modern warfare routinely turns victims into 
persecutors by forcing men, women, and children—as part of 
the harm inflicted on them—to harm others. Recent United 
Nations (U.N.) reports from Afghanistan describe a local mili-
tia’s practice of using children in its campaign of theft and arbi-
trary killing.1 Women and girls kidnapped in Nigeria by Boko 
Haram in 2014 describe their forced participation in military 
operations, including carrying ammunition and luring targets 
into ambushes.2 A forced recruit of a rebel group in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo described to the United Nations Secu-
rity Council his decade-long experience of fighting in the front 
lines, looting, and “violating international humanitarian law” 
after his forceful recruitment at age twelve.3 In Côte d’Ivoire, 
where sexual violence was used as a weapon of war by govern-
ment and resistance forces throughout the civil war, men re-
port being forced to rape fellow prisoners and their own rela-
tives in order to facilitate domination by the armed force.4 
Reports from Somalia tell of Al-Shabaab leaders threatening 
child soldiers with death if they refuse to execute the violent 
punishment the group metes out on people who breach its 
rules.5 Yet, through various amendments, Congress has barred 
individuals who have participated in the persecution of others 
from receiving nearly all immigration benefits, including hu-
 
 1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “TODAY WE SHALL ALL DIE”: AFGHANISTAN’S 
STRONGMEN AND THE LEGACY OF IMPUNITY 31–33, 33 n.29 (2015) (indicating 
that a U.N. official reported to Human Rights Watch that complaints had been 
received concerning forced recruitment of child soldiers in Afghanistan). 
 2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “THOSE TERRIBLE WEEKS IN THEIR CAMP”: 
BOKO HARAM VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS IN NORTHEAST NIGERIA 
2, 25–27 (2014). 
 3. Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Former Child Soldier Describes 
Forced Recruitment During Security Council Debate, Urges International 
Community to Aid Other Children Released by Armed Groups, U.N. Meetings 
Coverage SC/11832 (Mar. 25, 2015). 
 4. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “MY HEART IS CUT”: SEXUAL VIOLENCE BY 
REBELS AND PRO-GOVERNMENT FORCES IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE 4–5, 23–24, 31–32, 
74–75 (2007) (providing a summary and discussing rebel involvement, forced 
incest, and government involvement including forced rape by prisoners). 
 5. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO PLACE FOR CHILDREN: CHILD RECRUIT-
MENT, FORCED MARRIAGE, AND ATTACKS ON SCHOOLS IN SOMALIA 28–29 
(2012). 
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manitarian protection, even for those who are also the victims 
of persecution.6 As a result, the all too pervasive dynamic of us-
ing persecution to create persecutors has created a prolonged 
crisis in U.S. immigration law. 
The Supreme Court recognized the “difficult line-drawing 
problems” created by attempts to separate those who assist in 
persecution from the victims of that persecution when, due to 
the nature of the conflict, an individual may well be both.7 
Nonetheless, the Court twice tried to draw those lines. First, in 
Fedorenko v. United States, the Court interpreted the persecu-
tor bar to disqualify from entry to the U.S. a Nazi prisoner of 
war who then served as an armed guard at a concentration 
camp. As a guard, Fedorenko received pay, short periods of 
leave in the nearby town, and recognition for his service.8 The 
Court declared that “all those who assisted in the persecution 
of civilians” were excluded from the United States regardless of 
whether their actions were voluntary.9 
Next, in Negusie v. Holder, the Court vacated the lower 
court decision to bar from refugee protection Negusie, a former 
 
 6. For ease of reference, I discuss the “persecutor bar” as if it is a unitary 
feature in immigration law. As explained in Part II, however, a version of the 
bar with the same core language appears in multiple provisions of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act: 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E) (2012) (barring admis-
sion of any alien who was associated with the Nazis between March 23, 1933, 
and May 8, 1945, and who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participat-
ed in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or 
political opinion”); id. § 1227(a)(4)(D) (establishing removability on the same 
basis); id. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (excluding individuals who have participated in the 
persecution of others from the definition of “refugee”); id. § 1158(b)(2)(A) (bar-
ring asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (barring withholding of removal); id. 
§ 1229b(c)(5) (barring cancellation of removal); id. § 1255(a) (requiring admis-
sibility to become a lawful permanent resident and 8 U.S.C. § 1182 does not 
provide a waiver of inadmissibility for the persecutor bar); id. § 1427 (requir-
ing an immigrant to be a permanent resident in order to naturalize). The 
ground of inadmissibility and removability is limited to association with the 
Nazis, while the bar to refugee protection and cancellation of removal is not. 
But the interpretation of the bar’s scope hinges on the language common to 
these provisions, and the legislative history shows that the provisions are de-
rived from the same source and share similar statements of congressional in-
tent. 
 7. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 n.34 (1981). The Court 
compared the acts performed by concentration camp inmates who cut the hair 
of female inmates before they were executed with the acts of a paid, armed 
guard who shot at inmates attempting to escape the camp but who was also a 
prisoner of war. Id. 
 8. Id. at 500. 
 9. Id. at 512. 
  
456 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:453 
 
Eritrean prisoner who was beaten, tortured, and forced to per-
form the duties of an armed guard at the prison where he was 
also confined. Negusie applied for protection in the U.S. after 
he eventually fled the camp where he had been held by swim-
ming to a cargo ship and hiding in a storage container.10 The 
Negusie Court remanded the case to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) with instructions to reconsider its interpretation 
of the persecutor bar, explaining that “motive and intent” along 
with “voluntariness” may be relevant to the bar’s scope.11 For 
years, the immigration agency12 failed to answer the call.13 In 
the absence of an authoritative agency interpretation, federal 
circuit courts and immigration judges have been forced to ar-
rive at their own conclusions, often with divergent results.14 Af-
 
 10. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514–16 (2009). 
 11. Id. at 523–24. 
 12. In referring to the “immigration agency” or “the agency,” I mean those 
parts of the executive branch charged with adjudicating and interpreting im-
migration law through precedential decision-making or formal rule-making. 
These entities include the U.S. Attorney General and the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (part of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Im-
migration Review), which have the authority to issue precedential decisions 
interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1), 
(d)(1) (2012). The Attorney General also has rule-making authority, which she 
shares with the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 8 
U.S.C. § 1103(a), (g). Separately, DHS adjudicates applications for immigra-
tion benefits, which involve the application of the persecutor bar. Id. § 1103(a). 
 13. BIA sought supplemental briefing twice on remand from the Supreme 
Court and then suspended those requests twice in favor of rule-making. See 
Letter from David Neal, Chairman, BIA, to Hiroko Kusuda, Loyola Law Clinic 
Det. Project & DHS-ICE Det. Ctr. (June 15, 2009) (on file with author) (seek-
ing briefs regarding the persecutor bar from parties and amici curiae); Letter 
from Rebecca Moguera, Legal Assistant, BIA, to Scholars for Int’l Refugee Law 
et al. (Feb. 6, 2013) (on file with author) (reinstating the initial request for 
supplemental briefing). However, the BIA suspended both of these requests. 
See E-mail from Benjamin Casper, Visiting Assoc. Clinical Professor of Law, 
Univ. of Minn. Law School, to author (Sept. 28, 2016) (on file with author). 
 14. See Martine Forneret, Pulling the Trigger: An Analysis of Circuit 
Court Review of the “Persecutor Bar,” 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1007, 1017–38 
(2013) (examining the inconsistent implementation of the persecutor bar 
across circuits and describing the four categories of “triggering factors” circuit 
courts use to apply the bar). The Fourth Circuit, in one unpublished case, 
stated that the bar applies so long as the applicant’s conduct objectively fur-
thered the persecution of others even without personal participation in the 
persecutory acts. In another case interpreting the same language in a different 
statute, that court required active involvement and a causal nexus between 
the applicant’s behavior and instances of persecution. Compare Ntamack v. 
Holder, 372 F. App’x 407 (4th Cir. 2010), with Haddam v. Holder, 547 F. App’x 
306 (4th Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit has held that an applicant’s state of 
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ter several false starts, the BIA has called for supplemental 
briefs from the parties and amici curiae to address whether an 
involuntariness or duress exception exists to limit the applica-
tion of the persecutor bar and, if so, what standard should ap-
ply.15 This Article examines the international and domestic ori-
gins of the persecutor bar, along with documents preserved in 
the French National Archive, to answer these questions. 
By analyzing—for the first time—policy directives and ap-
pellate decisions preserved in the French National Archive, this 
Article recovers the history of the bar’s application by its front-
line adjudicators at the time Congress first incorporated it 
wholesale into U.S. law—a history that conflicts with 
Fedorenko’s conceptions of the bar’s original meaning and 
Negusie’s conception of this history’s relevance to U.S. asylum 
law. While other scholars have offered legal and moral theories 
regarding the role of culpability in the application of the perse-
cutor bar, none have offered support for a duress defense based 
on the bar’s original scope.16 The unique historical analysis pro-
 
mind is irrelevant to the bar’s application, while the Eighth Circuit has exam-
ined an applicant’s “shared . . . persecutory motive[ ],” and the Ninth Circuit 
requires “purposeful assistance.” See, e.g., Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998 
(9th Cir. 2013); Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 740 (7th Cir. 2005); Hernan-
dez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 812 (8th Cir. 2001). Since Negusie, the Second Cir-
cuit and others have remanded cases involving the persecutor bar because it is 
unclear what interpretation they should apply and therefore unclear how they 
should review the agency’s decisions. See Zi Xin Chen v. Holder, 552 F. App’x 
26 (2d Cir. 2014); Maiga v. Holder, 345 F. App’x 634 (2d. Cir. 2009); Ru Lian v. 
Holder, 326 F. App’x 315 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Inconsistencies pervade 
the agency decisions as well. One immigration judge determined that a mem-
ber of the Oromo ethnic group, who had been tortured by the Ethiopian gov-
ernment as a child and then forced to fight for that army, was ineligible for 
asylum because he fired on civilians after watching commanders kill people 
who refused or tried to escape. In re Aseged Kebede, 2003 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 
4088 (B.I.A. 2003). Yet a different judge held that a child soldier for the Na-
tional Patriotic Front of Liberia, who was given cocaine and other drugs and 
then ordered to kill people, was not disqualified under the persecutor bar. 
Sackie v. Ashcroft, 270 F. Supp. 2d 596 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 
 15. See Amicus Invitation No. 16-08-08, Amicus Invitation (Duress Excep-
tion to Persecutor Bar), B.I.A. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/ 
882811/download. 
 16. See Stephen J. Massey, Individual Responsibility for Assisting the Na-
zis in Persecuting Civilians, 71 MINN. L. REV. 97, 112–16, 113 n.90 (1986) (dis-
cussing the overriding importance of the persecutor bar’s original application 
rather than its text to establishing its meaning). Compare Melani Johns, 
Comment, Adjusting the Asylum Bar: Negusie v. Holder and the Need To In-
corporate a Defense of Duress into the “Persecutor Bar,” 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 235, 261 (2010) (recommending that Congress amend the definition of 
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vided here supports a duress defense with evidence that con-
cerns for individual responsibility were present at the time of 
 
“refugee” to include duress as a statutory defense to the persecutor bar to 
promote uniformity), and Karl Goodman, Comment, Negusie v. Holder: The 
End of the Strict Liability Persecutor Bar?, 13 CUNY L. REV. 143, 159–66 
(2009) (arguing that the avoidance of “absurd or futile results,” comparable 
practices of other countries, and policy goals of the INA support duress de-
fense), with Tasha Wiesman, Comment, Denying Relief to the Persecutor: An 
Argument in Favor of Adopting the Dissenting Opinion of Negusie v. Holder, 
44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 559 (2011) (arguing that a bright-line exclusion of all 
past persecutors is required because case-by-case assessments of individual 
facts will lead to disuniformity and that the Convention Against Torture pro-
vides adequate protection for individuals forced to persecute others). Bryan 
Lonegan asserts that the persecutor bar should not apply to any child forced to 
fight when he was younger than sixteen based on the international agree-
ments and U.S. laws that designate child soldiers as victims, not perpetrators 
and recognize their diminished mental capacity due to age. Bryan Lonegan, 
Sinners or Saints: Child Soldiers and the Persecutor Bar to Asylum After 
Negusie v. Holder, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 71 (2011). Abbe L. Dienstag re-
viewed the utilitarian, retributive, and symbolic functions of a duress defense 
in civil immigration law and denaturalization proceedings and argues that 
these principles militate its availability for what she terms “victim accom-
plice,” a concept Justice Stevens identified in his Fedorenko dissent. Abbe L. 
Dienstag, Comment, Fedorenko v. United States: War Crimes, the Defense of 
Duress, and American Nationality Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 120, 162–70 (1982); 
see also Leah Durland, Comment, Overcoming the Persecutor Bar: Applying a 
Purposeful Mens Rea Requirement to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), 32 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 571, 596–608 (2009) (arguing that the Model Penal Code’s purposeful 
standard, with the burden on the applicant, should be required rather than 
duress because it would lead to more uniform results while protecting deserv-
ing applicants); Mark Philipp, Case Note, Assisting in Persecution: Analyzing 
the Decision in Negusie v. Gonzales, 231 F. App’x 325 (5th Cir. 2007), 34 S. ILL. 
U. L.J. 417, 441–44 (2010) (advocating for a totality of the circumstances test 
to assess culpability that would be more flexible than the defense of duress). 
Similarly, scholars who have examined the history of the International 
Refugee Organization (IRO) and its Constitution—the source of the persecutor 
bar in U.S. law as discussed in Part II—have not explored the administration 
of that bar. Louise W. Holborn authored an exhaustive review of the IRO and 
explained that “the Constitution was only a framework for the work of the 
IRO, and the spirit in which this work was to be carried out would be far more 
important than the framework itself,” but her review does not discuss applica-
tion of the persecutor bar. LOUISE W. HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFU-
GEE ORGANIZATION, A SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS: ITS HIS-
TORY AND WORK, 1946-1952, at 53, 175 (1956); see also GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL 
& JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161–90 (3d ed. 2007) 
(describing the exclusions contained in the United Nations agreements on the 
Status of Refugees that relate to the IRO’s persecutor bar); NEHEMIAH 
ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS HISTO-
RY, CONTENTS, AND INTERPRETATION, A COMMENTARY 65–69 (1953). 
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the bar’s inception.17 This history builds on philosophical 
frameworks offered by other scholars to create a coherent doc-
trine that should define the bar’s application under current 
law. In particular, the Article engages Stephen Massey’s schol-
arship in the wake of Fedorenko, which recast the majority’s 
opinion in terms of moral philosophy and proposed a frame-
work to assign individual responsibility for collective action.18 
Unlike the Court in Fedorenko, however, Massey recognized 
that as a philosophical matter, “voluntariness” is crucial to at-
tributing moral responsibility.19 With the Court’s decision in 
Negusie, the Court put voluntariness, motive, and intent back 
on the table. This Article, then, picks up where Massey left off. 
While the Court may have been correct in applying the 
persecutor bar to Fedorenko but reversing its application to 
Negusie, the Court’s reasoning in these cases was not. I argue 
that the proper resolution of these and future cases requires in-
terpreting the persecutor bar to incorporate the defense of du-
ress as a test for moral choice. Inclusion of a duress defense 
reconciles the bar’s legislative history, its sources in interna-
tional law, and the application of similar exclusions in immi-
gration law. At the same time, a duress defense provides a co-
herent, administrable, and principled standard with which to 
draw the difficult lines the Supreme Court foresaw. 
Part I begins with a discussion of Supreme Court cases 
that examine various iterations of the persecutor bar. While 
raising different factors for the immigration agency to consider 
when interpreting the bar, these decisions ultimately leave a 
vast space within which the agency can make its policy choice. 
Part II returns to the source of the persecutor bar by describing 
its drafting in the International Refugee Organization (IRO) 
Constitution and the decisions of the IRO’s appellate Eligibility 
Review Board, which demonstrate how that bar was originally 
understood and administered. These sources show that the bar 
was not applied to victims of persecution—even if those victims 
were forced to persecute others. Though the original documents 
do not reflect a fully-formed duress defense, they display a con-
 
 17. Massey, supra note 16.  
 18. Id. at 98–99, 144–49; see also id. at 116 (“Rather than openly 
acknowledge that it was making a moral decision regarding the level of moral 
responsibility necessary to find that an individual has met the legal standard 
[for assisting in persecuting civilians], the Court pretended that its conclusion 
was dictated by neutral arguments of statutory construction.”). 
 19. See id. at 143–44. 
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cern for culpability that undermines the Supreme Court’s anal-
ysis in Fedorenko and the BIA’s even stricter application of the 
bar. Part III examines the persecutor bar’s multiple appearanc-
es in U.S. law and Congress’s common reference to the Consti-
tution of the IRO, international refugee agreements, and deci-
sions of military tribunals as the sources informing its 
understanding of the persecutor bar. I assert that in light of 
this evidence of congressional intent, the persecutor bar should 
be interpreted consistently with these three sources. Part IV, in 
turn, explores the meaning of the exclusions contained in these 
sources, including international refugee agreements and the ju-
risprudence developed by the war crimes tribunals. In both 
contexts, the duress defense emerged to limit liability for acts 
that would otherwise be considered persecutory. 
I conclude that the immigration agency should interpret 
the persecutor bar so as not to apply to acts committed under 
duress. Using the standard developed by the international mili-
tary tribunals and applied to the international refugee agree-
ments, the bar should not apply to a person whose acts were 
done to avoid an immediate and irreparable harm to her or her 
family, where she could not escape the harm threatened 
against her, and the harm she caused was no greater than the 
harm threatened against her. This standard requires more 
than coercion; it requires the absence of choice. Such an inter-
pretation would be consistent with the bar’s historical devel-
opment, the various statements of congressional intent, the 
United States’ international treaty obligations, and the agen-
cy’s application of similar exclusions in immigration law. More-
over, an interpretation that contemplates duress represents 
sound policy by drawing a line between those victims who chose 
to engage in the persecution of others and those who did not. 
I.  A CLEAN SLATE ON WHICH TO WRITE   
The Supreme Court has considered the meaning of the per-
secutor bar twice. In Fedorenko, it determined that the bar 
made no exception for involuntary assistance in the persecution 
of others. In Negusie, the Court decided that motive, intent, 
and voluntariness may indeed be relevant. With Negusie, how-
ever, the Court declined to interpret the meaning of the perse-
cutor bar itself. It instead directed the immigration agency to 
reconsider its position that the bar applies without regard to an 
individual’s will. Further, the Court severed the meaning of the 
persecutor bar at issue in Fedorenko from the one at issue in 
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Negusie. This Part examines the progressive interpretation of 
the persecutor bar by the Court and the BIA and then outlines 
the considerable space left for the immigration agency as it de-
termines the bar’s scope anew. Part III then explains why the 
two versions of the bar must be construed together. 
Before commencing the discussion of the jurisprudence 
surrounding the persecutor bar and its pitfalls, a brief review of 
terminology is required. The Supreme Court and the immigra-
tion agency refer at different times to voluntariness, coercion, 
knowledge, intent, motivation and culpability.20 These concepts 
are derived from criminal law and are critical to understanding 
how the persecutor bar was historically applied. At base is the 
notion of culpability or blameworthiness.21 Culpability ties lia-
bility to conduct that warrants moral condemnation.22 Accord-
ingly, criminal liability generally requires the combination of a 
culpable mental state and an unlawful act.23 Intent is one of 
these mental states. Traditionally, an intentional mental state 
signified that an individual intended to engage in specific con-
duct and either wanted his acts to cause certain consequences 
or knew that those consequences were substantially certain to 
 
 20. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516–23 (2009) (referring to mo-
tive, intent, knowledge, coercion, duress, and culpability); Fedorenko v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981) (referring to voluntariness); In re Lapienecks 
18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 464 (B.I.A. 1983) (referring to motive and intent). 
 21. Culpability & Blameworthy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 22. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) (“American criminal 
law has long considered a defendant’s intention—and therefore his moral 
guilt—to be critical to the degree of his criminal culpability, and the Court has 
found criminal penalties to be unconstitutionally excessive in the absence of 
intentional wrongdoing.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Herbert 
Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal 
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1435 (1968) (“The law promotes the general se-
curity by building confidence that those whose conduct does not warrant con-
demnation will not be convicted of a crime. . . . The tendency of present 
thought in the United States is to consider this so fundamental that criminal 
liability without regard to culpability would raise the gravest constitutional 
question, at least if major sanctions are involved.”). 
 23. See generally Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) 
(noting that liability requires the “concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with 
an evil-doing hand”); Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 
63 COLUM. L. REV. 594, 594–95 (1963) (“The most important aspect of the 
[Model Penal] Code is its affirmation of the centrality of mens rea, an affirma-
tion that is brilliantly supported by its careful articulation of the elements of 
liability and of the various modes of culpability to which attention must be 
paid in framing the definitions of the various criminal offenses.”). 
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result from his acts.24 More recently, criminal law distinguishes 
between intent and knowledge so that one acts purposely if “it 
is his conscious object” to cause a result and knowingly if “he is 
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause 
such a result.”25 The term “intent” can also encompass both 
“general intent” and “specific intent.” General intent refers to 
only the intention to make the bodily movement which consti-
tutes the criminal act, while specific intent requires the intent 
to bring about the consequences of the act.26 Because of the 
heightened level of intent involved, the mental states of specific 
intent or purpose are more culpable than other mental states, 
such as recklessness or negligence. Motive sits apart from in-
tent in that intent relates to the means for accomplishing some-
thing (A intends to kill B), while motive relates to the ends (be-
cause A wants B’s money).27 
Strict liability lies in contrast to the culpability created by 
a blameworthy mental state (e.g. intent/purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness, or negligence) because it imposes punishment 
based on a result alone.28 Strict liability is commonly criticized 
for attaching the condemnation of a criminal conviction without 
proof that an individual is morally blameworthy.29 
The term “voluntary” in criminal law is used in a narrow 
sense to exclude only those acts that are the result of a reflex, 
convulsion, hypnosis, etc., or occur during sleep or uncon-
sciousness.30 In the context of the persecutor bar, however, the 
term “voluntary” is used to designate an act performed without 
outside interference and uncompelled by outside influence.31 In 
this way, voluntariness signals the absence of coercion. Du-
ress—sometimes referred to as compulsion or coercion—is a de-
 
 24. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(a), at 340 (2d 
ed. 2003). 
 25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i), (b)(i) (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see al-
so LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.2(b), at 342–43.  
 26. LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.2(e), at 352–55; see Carter v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000) (describing the difference between general 
and specific intent). 
 27. LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 5.3(a), at 358–59. 
 28. Id. § 5.5, at 381. 
 29. Id. § 5.5(c), at 390 & n.35. Consequently, the Model Penal Code limits 
strict liability offenses to non-criminal regulatory violations “because the con-
demnatory aspect of a criminal conviction or of a correctional sentence is ex-
plicitly precluded.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
 30. LAFAVE, supra note 24, § 6.1(c), at 426. 
 31. Voluntary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); infra Part II.A. 
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fense to liability: an individual who “under the pressure of an 
unlawful threat from another human being to harm him, com-
mits what would otherwise be a crime may, under some cir-
cumstances, be excused for doing what he did.”32 The standard 
for the duress defense is discussed in Part IV, but it is im-
portant to note that duress looks to the nature of the threat and 
the ability to escape, among other factors, thereby requiring 
more than merely outside interference and influence (e.g. in-
voluntariness) to escape criminal liability. With these basic def-
initions as background, the Article moves to the current state of 
the law. 
A. THE EARLY REJECTION OF VOLUNTARINESS IN FEDORENKO V. 
UNITED STATES 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the first appearance 
of the persecutor bar in U.S. immigration law set the course for 
a constrained and unsupported reading over the next twenty-
five years. In its 1981 decision in Fedorenko, the Court exam-
ined the bar contained in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 
(DPA).33 This Act enabled the over 300,000 European refugees 
created by World War II to emigrate to the United States. The 
DPA adopted the definitions of “refugees and displaced per-
sons,” along with their exclusions, from the Constitution of the 
International Refugee Organization (IRO), an entity created by 
the United Nations to support and resettle nearly a million in-
dividuals displaced after the war.34 The case arose out of the 
denaturalization action against Feodor Fedorenko.35 Fedorenko 
 
 32. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 9.7, at 72 (2d ed. 
2003). 
 33. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 
(1948); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 493 (1981). 
 34. See infra Part II.A. 
 35. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 493. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1952 required United States attorneys to institute proceedings to revoke the 
order admitting a person to citizenship and cancelling the certificate of natu-
ralization where “the order and certificate of naturalization were illegally pro-
cured or were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrep-
resentation.” Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, sec. 340(a), 66 Stat. 
163, 260 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012)). The gov-
ernment brought such an action in district court to strip Fedorenko of his citi-
zenship. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D. Fla. 1978), 
rev’d, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff ’d, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). In the late 
1970s, the U.S. government began efforts to find and prosecute former Nazi 
persecutors who had immigrated to the United States after World War II. See 
ALLAN A. RYAN, QUIET NEIGHBORS: PROSECUTING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS IN 
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was born in the Ukraine and was drafted into the Russian ar-
my in World War II. He was then captured by the Germans and 
taken as a prisoner of war.36 As a POW, Fedorenko was trained 
to be a concentration camp guard and stationed at the camp in 
Treblinka, Poland.37 Fedorenko failed to disclose that he had 
served as an armed guard at Treblinka when he obtained a visa 
to enter the United States under the DPA. He was admitted to 
the United States as a permanent resident in 1949 and became 
a citizen in 1970. 
The Court granted certiorari to clarify the standard for 
when a factual misrepresentation would support revocation of 
an immigrant’s citizenship.38 In the end, though, the Court did 
not decide the question.39 Instead, the Court held that 
Fedorenko was ineligible for a visa under the DPA’s persecutor 
bar.40 Thus, according to the Court, Fedorenko’s citizenship was 
 
AMERICA 7–28 (1984). 
 36. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 494. 
 37. Id. at 493. The facts in Fedorenko align with historical scholarship on 
the experiences of prisoners of war who were captured by Nazi forces. See Pe-
ter Black, Foot Soldiers of the Final Solution: The Trawniki Training Camp 
and Operation Reinhard, 25 HOLOCAUST & GENOCIDE STUD. 1, 1–9 (2011) 
(discussing the Trawniki Training Camp where the “Trawniki men,” largely of 
Ukrainian origin, were trained to serve as guards for killing centers and labor 
camps established by Operation Reinhard and were generally able to choose 
whether to enter these units). 
 38. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 493; Brief for Petitioner at 2–3, Fedorenko v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (No. 79-5602), 1980 WL 339957, at *11; 
Brief for the Respondent at 1, Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) 
(No. 79-5602), 1980 WL 339958, at *17. The Supreme Court’s earlier decision 
in Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960), required the government to 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the misrepresentation was “mate-
rial.” Chaunt provided that facts are material when (1) “if known, [they] would 
have warranted denial of citizenship”; or (2) “their disclosure might have been 
useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts war-
ranting denial of citizenship.” 364 U.S. at 355. The dispute over the standard 
centered on whether the government had to prove that an investigation defini-
tively would have revealed facts warranting a denial of citizenship, as the Dis-
trict Court concluded, or that an investigation might have uncovered facts 
warranting a denial of citizenship, as the Fifth Circuit ruled. See Fedorenko, 
449 U.S. at 502–04; United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 
1979); Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 916–18. 
 39. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 516, 518 n.40. 
 40. Id. at 507, 514–16. “Any person who shall willfully make a misrepre-
sentation for the purpose of gaining admission into the United States as an 
eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible into the United 
States.” Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 10, 62 Stat. 1009, 
1013 (1948). The Court determined that Fedorenko would not have been 
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“illegally procured” because he had failed to meet the statutory 
prerequisites of being admitted as a lawful permanent resident 
on the basis of a valid visa.41 
The Court arrived at its interpretation of the DPA’s perse-
cutor bar by comparing the text of two related exclusionary 
provisions adopted from the Constitution of the IRO42: one 
which barred anyone who “assisted the enemy in persecuting 
civil populations of countries” that are Members of the United 
Nations (the persecutor bar),43 and the other barring anyone 
who “voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak 
of the second world war in their operations against the United 
Nations.”44 The Court reasoned that because the exclusion for 
military activities was limited to those who “voluntarily assist-
ed the enemy forces,” the persecutor bar “made all those who 
assisted in the persecution of civilians ineligible for visas,” 
whether that assistance was voluntary or involuntary.45 
At this point, the Court added a footnote,46 which has 
prompted years of scrutiny by adjudicators attempting to de-
fine the persecutor bar’s scope.47 The footnote states that the 
 
granted a DPA visa under the persecutor bar if he had disclosed his service as 
an armed concentration camp guard and therefore his misrepresentation was 
material and his visa invalid. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507–09. 
 41. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 507, 514–15 (explaining that “our cases have 
established that a naturalized citizen’s failure to comply with the statutory 
prerequisites for naturalization renders his certificate of citizenship revocable 
as ‘illegally procured’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)” and that the DPA’s provisions 
concerning the persecutor bar and material misrepresentations rendered the 
visa on which his naturalization was premised invalid). 
 42. Displaced Persons Act § 2(b); see also David Birnbaum, Denaturaliza-
tion and Deportation of Nazi War Criminals in the United States: Upholding 
Constitutional Principles in a Single Proceeding, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 201, 206–09 (1989) (discussing the history and adoption of the DPA 
and subsequent cases involving the denaturalization of Nazi war criminals). 
The IRO Constitution, appearing at 62 Stat. 3037–55, was ratified by the 
United States on December 16, 1946, and became effective on August 20, 1948. 
See T. I. A. S. No. 1846, 62 Stat. 3037 (1948); see also infra Part II (discussing 
the creation of the IRO). 
 43. Displaced Persons Act § 2(a). 
 44. Id. § 10 (emphasis added) (incorporating Annex I of the IRO Constitu-
tion and replicated at 62 Stat. 3051–52). 
 45. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512. 
 46. Id. at 512 n.34. 
 47. Brief for Petitioner, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-
499), 2008 WL 2445504, at *13; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the Unit-
ed Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Support of Petitioner, Negusie 
v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550609; Brief Amicus 
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prisoners forced to deceive Jews about the purpose of the Tre-
blinka camp “cannot be found to have assisted in the persecu-
tion of civilians.”48 It contrasted these individuals—whose ac-
tions included playing in an orchestra at the entrance to the 
camp to welcome incoming prisoners, wearing Red Cross arm 
bands, leading prisoners from the trains to a building disguised 
as a lazaret, cutting the hair of women prisoners before taking 
them to a gas chamber labeled as a bath, and undressing old 
and infirm prisoners about to be killed—with Fedorenko, who 
“was issued a uniform and armed with a rifle and a pistol, who 
was paid a stipend and was regularly allowed to leave the con-
centration camp to visit a nearby village, and who admitted to 
shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the commandant 
of the camp.”49 Though the Court attempted to separate the vic-
tims of persecution from their persecutors through the term 
“persecution,” the Court acknowledged that other cases could 
present “more difficult line-drawing problems.”50 
The Court arrived at its conclusion regarding the bar for 
involuntary conduct despite the fact that the government did 
not assert this view. While the Court’s decision turned on the 
text of the persecutor bar in the DPA, the parties’ briefing did 
not. In its brief to the Fifth Circuit, the government stated that 
“in this case” it “had no quarrel” with the district court’s inter-
pretation, in which it required voluntariness for the bar to ap-
ply.51 And then when addressing the Supreme Court, the Solici-
tor General assumed arguendo that the question of whether 
Fedorenko’s service as a guard was compelled was relevant to 
the application of the DPA’s persecutor bar.52 
 
Curiae of the Advocates for Human Rights in Support of Petitioner, Negusie v. 
Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550608; see also Dienstag, 
supra note 16, at 128–32; Massey, supra note 16, at 97. 
 48. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 n.34. These activities were discussed by 
the prisoner-laborers who had escaped Treblinka and testified against 
Fedorenko in the District Court. See United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 
893, 902 n.12 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev’d, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff ’d, 449 
U.S. 490 (1981). 
 49. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 513 n.34. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 513 n.35; id. at 536 nn.8–9 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 52. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 38, at *35. In the government’s 
view, the question presented as to Chaunt’s materiality test turned on wheth-
er the standard was that the disclosure of the true facts would have led to an 
investigation that might have revealed facts warranting a denial of citizenship 
or if the true facts would have led to an investigation that would have re-
vealed facts warranting a denial of citizenship. Id. at *23. Because the gov-
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The Court relied heavily on the testimony of Officer Kemp-
ton Jenkins to support its statutory analysis.53 Officer Jenkins 
had served as a vice consul in the U.S. Foreign Service and re-
viewed approximately 5000 visa applications under the DPA 
from displaced persons and refugees receiving IRO services.54 
He testified that he knew of no camp guards granted visas un-
der the Act, but also admitted he remembered only three cases 
involving guards.55 He explained that the vice-consuls consid-
ered involuntary camp guard service to be an inherent contra-
diction in terms because no guard ever attempted to convince 
the vice-consuls that his service had been involuntary.56 Rather, 
he stated that former guards invariably admitted that they had 
chosen to become a guard because the conditions were more 
comfortable than in the forced labor divisions.57 Consequently, 
 
ernment advocated for the first interpretation, it would prevail under the cor-
rect interpretation of Chaunt regardless of whether the statute permitted an 
exception for involuntary assistance: either way the true facts would have led 
to an inquiry that might have resulted in denial. Id. at *42; see also Fedorenko, 
449 U.S at 536 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Attorney General 
himself argued the case and presuming that “the decision not to question the 
District Court’s construction of the statute was reached only after the matter 
had been reviewed with the utmost care”). 
 53. The Court described Jenkins as “particularly well informed about the 
practice concerning the eligibility of former camp guards for DPA visas.” 
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 511. 
 54. Id. at 496–99, 496 n.5. Countries willing to resettle refugees and dis-
placed persons negotiated individual agreements with the IRO addressing the 
country’s standards for accepting someone, post-resettlement conditions, legal 
status of refugee immigrants, and selection procedures. Candidates for reset-
tlement in a particular country were initially screened by IRO personnel and 
then given to the country missions for selection based on that country’s per-
sonal, occupational, and physical criteria. Exec. Sec’y of Preparatory Comm’n, 
Report to the General Council of the International Refugee Organization, at 
33–36 (Sept. 1948). 
 55. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 912 (S.D. Fla. 1978), 
rev’d, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff ’d, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).  
 56. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 952 (5th Cir. 1979), aff ’d, 
449 U.S. 490 (1981); see also Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 510 n.32 (stating that he 
could not conceive of the “hypothetical situation” in which a concentration 
camp guard was there involuntarily); Brief for the Respondent, supra note 38, 
at *42 n.31 (citing Jenkins’s testimony that in his opinion there were no invol-
untary concentration camp guards). 
 57. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 952. This perception coincides with more re-
cent scholarship on the origins and circumstances of the auxiliary forces used 
to operate the concentration camps. See Black, supra note 37, at 1–15, 38 
(2011) (describing how after the spring of 1942 many Soviet POWs chose to 
serve as concentration camp guards to escape forced labor and to receive the 
benefits and freedoms of serving as a policeman; these freedoms included be-
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he testified that guards were ineligible for visas under both the 
persecutor bar and the bar for those who had voluntarily as-
sisted enemy forces.58 He explained that he would have also 
considered the kapos, the Jewish prisoners who supervised 
Jewish workers in the camp, to be excluded from the benefits of 
the DPA because of their assistance to the Nazis in supervising 
the activities of other Jewish prisoners.59 Yet, Officer Jenkins 
acknowledged that it was difficult to determine whether the ev-
idence in a particular inmate’s case justified a determination 
that he collaborated with his persecutors, that he had not han-
dled a case involving this kind of applicant, and that he did not 
know of any specific case in which a kapo was in fact denied a 
visa.60 
The Court’s departure from the question presented result-
ed in a fractured decision. Chief Justice Burger concurred in 
the judgment only; Justice Blackmun wrote separately to re-
solve the materiality standard.61 Justice White dissented, stat-
ing that the DPA’s persecutor bar is “not entirely unambiguous, 
and the parties have not addressed the proper interpretation of 
the statute.”62 He explained that “the words ‘assist’ and ‘perse-
cute’ suggest that [the bar] would not apply to an individual 
whose actions were truly coerced.”63 Justice Stevens dissented 
separately. He described the course of the litigation as “de-
pressing,” resulting in a decision founded “on a theory that no 
litigant argued, that the Government expressly disavowed, and 
that may jeopardize the citizenship of countless survivors of 
Nazi concentration camps.”64 Ultimately, he predicted that 
“human suffering will be the consequence of today’s venture.”65 
According to Justice Stevens, the Court’s footnoted attempt 
to distinguish victims from their persecutors also floundered in 
its foundation. The Court’s identification of Fedorenko’s uni-
form, weapon, pay, leave time, and service recognition as fea-
tures distinguishing him from the camp inmates had nothing to 
 
ing paid and being able to seek reassignment). 
 58. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 38, at *41 n.31. 
 59. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 510 n.32; id. at 534 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 913. 
 60. Brief for Respondent, supra note 38, at *41 n.31.  
 61. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 518. 
 62. Id. at 527 (White, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 527 n.3. 
 64. Id. at 530 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. at 538. 
  
2016] DRAWING LINES 469 
 
do with the term “persecution.”66 However, the acts committed 
by working prisoners at Treblinka undoubtedly did contribute 
to the persecution carried out there. A survivor of Treblinka 
who testified against Fedorenko, when asked if he “assist[ed] in 
bringing [prisoners] to their death,” stated, “We automatically 
assisted, all of us, but . . . it was under the fear and terror.”67 
The majority’s footnote, said Justice Stevens, thus ignored the 
contributions of coerced prisoners, which were similar to the 
acts of the guards, and relied instead on facts unrelated to the 
term “persecution” to try to draw difficult lines.68 
Despite the opinions by the other Justices, the majority 
stated that all those who assisted in the persecution of civilians 
were excluded by the bar contained in the DPA and provided 
little guidance as to how to separate the persecuted from the 
persecutors where the nature of the persecution merged the 
two.69 
Alongside Justice Stevens, commentators have likewise 
criticized the Court’s superficial approach to statutory inter-
pretation at the expense of a more considered review of policy 
trade-offs and principles of liability. Stephen Massey, writing 
soon after the Fedorenko decision, faulted the Court’s analysis 
for relying on congressional intent unsupported by legislative 
history, failing to consider a portion of the DPA that created 
significant ambiguity as to the requirement for voluntariness, 
and ignoring the moral judgments implicit in the Court’s opin-
ion.70 
In the wake of the decision, Massey suggested a framework 
for lower courts to use to administer the persecutor bar in the 
context of the denaturalization proceedings of other alleged 
Nazi collaborators. Fedorenko removed voluntariness and coer-
cion from consideration, which Massey questioned, but follow-
ing Fedorenko, he too excluded these concerns from his analy-
sis.71 Consequently, his framework—derived from the work of 
moral philosophers—focused on how to attribute individual re-
sponsibility for the harms caused by a collective without con-
 
 66. Id. at 535 n.6. 
 67. Id. at 534 n.4. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 509–10 (majority opinion). 
 70. Massey, supra note 16, at 112–16; see also Dienstag, supra note 16, at 
128–32 (criticizing the mechanical analysis of the Court that ignored the ju-
risprudential considerations of denying protection based on coerced acts). 
 71. Massey, supra note 16, at 112–16, 143–44. 
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sidering the effect of threats and the ability to choose not to 
harm others in measuring that responsibility. Massey asserted 
that moral responsibility, and thus the persecutor bar, should 
attach when an individual makes more than a minimal contri-
bution to a group that he knows has as its objective the perse-
cution of civilians.72 An individual’s contribution, in turn, 
should be measured by the degree of initiative required, the 
complexity of the task assigned, the closeness of the connection 
between the individual’s task and the harm caused, the degree 
of authority given to the individual, and the collective’s estima-
tion of the contribution as demonstrated through wages and 
privileges provided to the individual.73 Under this rubric, mem-
bership alone, in an organization that had the persecution of 
others as one of its objectives, is too small a contribution to 
trigger individual responsibility for the group’s actions.74 Mas-
sey’s framework for moral responsibility, however, does not ac-
count for individuals who make substantial contributions to a 
group knowing that the group’s goal is to persecute, but do so 
only under extreme coercion. His framework can guide courts 
in answering the question of what kind of participation makes 
an individual culpable for the harm caused by a collective. But 
it does not measure culpability when an individual’s contribu-
tion is undisputed but his ability to avoid contributing to collec-
tive harm is. The Supreme Court later recognized the potential 
overbreadth of its position in Fedorenko, but not before the BIA 
went even further in disregarding traditional indicia of culpa-
bility including one of Massey’s key factors for moral responsi-
bility: knowledge that one’s acts contribute to the harm of oth-
ers. 
B. THE AGENCY ADDS STRICT LIABILITY 
With the Supreme Court’s sweeping statements as to the 
bar’s reach, the BIA took over the role as interpreter and ar-
rived at an even more severe view to create a form of strict lia-
bility. It crafted a rule that looks only to the “objective effects” 
of an individual’s actions, not his intent, level of participation, 
ability to avoid harming others, nor even his knowledge of the 
effect of his actions. 
 
 72. Id. at 98. 
 73. Id. at 145–47. 
 74. Id. at 147. 
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Two years after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Fedorenko, the BIA considered the deportability of a Latvian 
Political Police officer whose unit operated under the direction 
of the Nazi government during its occupation of Latvia from 
1941 until 1945.75 Edgar Laipenieks voluntarily joined this 
force in order to identify members of the Communist Party.76 
He testified that his responsibilities were limited to identifying 
and interrogating suspected communists,77 but he acknowl-
edged that the results of his investigations were used by his 
supervisors to make decisions about whether those individuals 
would be detained and beaten in the local prison, killed, or 
transferred to a concentration camp.78 Despite rising through 
the ranks of the Latvian Political Police, the German directors 
eventually permitted him to leave, providing him with a certifi-
cate of great service upon his departure.79 
The case required the BIA to construe a ground of deporta-
bility created by the Holtzman Amendment, which applied to 
any noncitizen who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise 
participated in the persecution of any person because of race, 
religion, national origin, or political opinion.”80 Applying 
Fedorenko, the BIA concluded that because Congress omitted a 
voluntariness requirement in the DPA’s persecutor bar and had 
considered the DPA when it enacted the amendment in 1978, 
Congress did not intend to include “an intent element” in the 
deportability ground.81 Thus, an individual’s “particular moti-
vations or intent . . . [were] not a relevant factor” to the scope of 
the statute.82 The BIA then considered the Court’s discussion of 
the need to “focus[] on whether particular conduct can be con-
sidered assisting in the persecution of civilians.”83 It determined 
that because intent was immaterial, the BIA must look to the 
“objective effect” of an individual’s actions.84 Laipenieks had 
 
 75. In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 434–36 (B.I.A. 1983), rev’d, 
Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 76. Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 449. 
 77. Id. at 450–51. 
 78. Id. at 452, 458. 
 79. Id. at 453. 
 80. Id. at 454, 463 (construing the Immigration and Nationality Act 
§ 241(a)(19)); see also Part III infra (discussing the history of this provision). 
 81. Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 464. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. (providing broader emphasis than the emphasis provided by the 
Supreme Court in Fedorenko’s note 34). 
 84. Id. at 465 (emphasizing that an objective approach must be used in 
  
472 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:453 
 
participated in the arrest, detention, and interrogation of polit-
ical prisoners and communicated with Nazi officials about the 
political activities of these prisoners, the objective effects of 
which led to their beatings and killings. The BIA concluded 
that Laipenieks had therefore assisted in the persecution of 
others and was deportable.85 
Next, the BIA applied its objective-effects test from In re 
Laipenieks to Fedorenko himself in the deportation proceedings 
that followed his denaturalization.86 In In re Fedorenko, the 
BIA accepted the district court’s findings that Fedorenko’s ser-
vice as an armed guard at Treblinka had been involuntary and 
that Fedorenko had not personally committed any of the atroci-
ties carried out there.87 The BIA concluded, though, that under 
its rule that “motivation and intent are irrelevant . . . and that 
it is the objective effect of an alien’s actions which is control-
ling,” Fedorenko was deportable.88 The effect of his conduct as a 
perimeter guard would have aided the Nazis “in some small 
measure” in their confinement and execution of Jewish prison-
ers and consequently he had assisted in their persecution.89 
Recognizing that its rule may lead to “harsh or inequitable” re-
sults, the BIA explained that “it was Congress’s intent that all 
who assisted the Nazis in persecuting others must be deported, 
and [the BIA] must comply with that intent.”90 
In In re Rodriguez-Majano,91 the BIA applied its rule again, 
but this time to the bar for asylum and withholding of removal 
contained in the Refugee Act of 1980.92 In 1983, Rodriguez-
Majano was working for his father’s cattle business in El Sal-
vador when his uncle and cousin were kidnapped and killed, 
 
this context). 
 85. Id. at 465–66. 
 86. In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57 (B.I.A. 1984); see Matthew 
Lippman, The Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in Oth-
er Anglo-American Legal Systems, 29 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1 (Fall 1998) (discuss-
ing the United States’ approach to imposing liability for Nazi war crimes 
through denaturalization then deportation as compared to other Anglo-Saxon 
countries—such as Canada and Australia—which created provisions in their 
national law that imposed criminal liability). Fedorenko was ultimately de-
ported to the Soviet Union and executed. 
 87. Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 68–69 & nn. 5–6.  
 88. Id. at 69. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 70 (emphasizing that anyone who helped Nazis in persecution 
related activities is subject to deportation). 
 91. In re Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811 (B.I.A. 1988). 
 92. Id. at 811. For discussion of the Refugee’s Act, see infra Part III. 
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reportedly by government forces, because they had been active 
in the guerrillas.93 Guerrillas later captured Rodriguez-Majano 
and commandeered several of his trucks, forcing him to 
transport guerilla supplies. He was released and then taken by 
the guerrillas again, escaping after two months. Soon after flee-
ing the guerrillas, government forces arrested and tortured 
him; he was eventually cleared of charges of collaboration and 
told to leave the country.94 Citing the Supreme Court in 
Fedorenko, the BIA stated that the “participation or assistance 
of an alien in persecution need not be of his own volition to bar 
him from relief.”95 
With the BIA’s conclusion that any contribution to the per-
secution of others, regardless of knowledge or circumstance, 
barred an individual from protection against his own persecu-
tion, the issue returned to the Supreme Court in 2009 in 
Negusie v. Holder. This time, however, the Court had the 
benefit of the considerable administrative law jurisprudence it 
developed in the interim. 
C. THE COURT’S CALL TO REINTERPRET THE PERSECUTOR BAR 
IN NEGUSIE V. HOLDER 
In Negusie v. Holder, the Court was again faced with the 
scope of the persecutor bar as it appeared in the Refugee Act.96 
Negusie, a dual national of Eritrea and Ethiopia, was con-
scripted by Eritrean officials to fight against Ethiopia.97 When 
Negusie refused, he was imprisoned, beaten, and forced to 
serve as an armed guard of other prisoners in the same camp.98 
He testified that as a guard he prevented the prisoners’ escape, 
kept them in the sun knowing it could cause death, and pre-
vented them from showering or getting fresh air.99 Negusie also 
testified that he never shot at anyone or directly punished any-
 
 93. Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 813. 
 94. Id. at 813–14. 
 95. Id. at 814. But it determined that Rodriguez-Majano was not disquali-
fied from refugee protection as a forced conscript of a Salvadoran guerrilla 
group because the “objective effects” of his acts had contributed to the general 
civil war and not the persecution of others on account of a protected ground. 
Id. at 815–16. 
 96. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009). 
 97. Id. at 514. 
 98. Id. at 515. 
 99. Id. 
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one and that he had helped prisoners when he could.100 He es-
caped after four years, swimming to a ship and hiding inside 
one of the containers.101 The container eventually arrived to the 
United States, where he filed applications for asylum and 
withholding of removal.102 
The underlying litigation and Supreme Court briefing 
placed in stark relief the troublesome consequences of the BIA’s 
interpretation of the persecutor bar and the humanitarian suf-
fering Justice Stevens predicted. The BIA had applied its rule 
to conclude that Negusie’s compelled service was immaterial 
and that the objective effects of his actions assisted the perse-
cution of the other prisoners.103 The Fifth Circuit affirmed, cit-
ing the Supreme Court’s holding in Fedorenko.104 In support of 
Negusie’s challenge, the U.N. and national advocacy groups in-
formed the Court that victims of persecution are commonly 
forced by their persecutors to participate in the persecution of 
others, arguing that the BIA’s rule was inconsistent with the 
United States’ international obligations, with the purpose of 
the Refugee Act, and with the line drawing in Fedorenko it-
self.105 
Forced to contend with the Court’s prior interpretation in 
Fedorenko that all those who had assisted the enemy in the 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 516. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees in Support of Petitioner, supra note 47, at *5 (dis-
cussing the United States’ international obligations under the 1967 Protocol); 
Brief Amicus Curiae of the Advocates for Human Rights in Support of Peti-
tioner, supra note 47 (discussing Fedorenko); Brief Amici Curiae of the Ameri-
can Jewish Congress and the American Jewish Committee in Support of Peti-
tioner at 22, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-449), 2008 WL 
2468542, at *22 (discussing international obligations, the Refugee Act, and 
Fedorenko); Brief Amici Curiae of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and 
16 Religious and Religious Freedom Organizations in Support of Petitioner at 
3, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550607, at 
*3 (discussing the history of authoritarian governments forcing participation 
in persecution); see also Brief for Scholars of International Refugee Law as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6, 13, 24, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 
511 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550611, at *6, *13, *24; Brief of Amici Cu-
riae Human Rights First, American Immigration Lawyers Association, Human 
Rights Watch, and U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants in Support of 
Petitioner at 11, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 
2597010, at *11. 
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persecution of civilian populations—voluntarily or not—were 
excluded from the United States,106 the Negusie Court described 
the Fedorenko decision as excluding “even those involved in 
nonculpable, involuntary assistance in Nazi persecution.”107 
However, the Court broke with Fedorenko and reversed 
and remanded the case, determining that the Refugee Act’s si-
lence on whether compulsion or duress is relevant to the perse-
cutor bar creates an ambiguity that must be interpreted first 
by the BIA under the principles governing judicial deference to 
agency interpretations, as announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.108 The Court concluded 
that its prior holding in Fedorenko that “voluntariness was not 
required with respect to another persecutor bar” did not control 
because the Refugee Act and DPA were adopted for different 
purposes and the Refugee Act did not contain the same statuto-
ry structure in which the word “voluntarily” was used in one 
provision and omitted from a parallel one.109 The Court con-
cluded that the BIA had not exercised its interpretive authori-
ty, but instead reflexively applied its interpretation of the 
Court’s decision in Fedorenko.110 
The Court left to the BIA to decide “[w]hatever weight or 
relevance” the DPA, Fedorenko, and international refugee 
agreements may have in interpreting the persecutor bar con-
tained in the Refugee Act.111 But the Court clarified that, in ar-
riving at its interpretation, the agency could reconsider the rel-
evance of “motive and intent” as well as “voluntariness.”112 
Each of the three separate Negusie opinions propose the 
answer the BIA should supply. Justice Thomas dissented in 
full. He determined that the persecutor bar contained in the 
Refugee Act was based on the similar exclusion in the DPA, 
and that, in 1996, Congress reenacted the bar from the Refugee 
Act aware of the Court’s interpretation in Fedorenko.113 Conse-
 
 106. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 519; Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 
512 (1981) (“[T]he deliberate omission of the word ‘voluntary’ from § 2(a) com-
pels the conclusion that the statute made all those who assisted in the perse-
cution of civilians ineligible for visas.”). 
 107. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 520. 
 108. Id. at 533–35; INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002); Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 109. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 518–19. 
 110. Id. at 520–23. 
 111. Id. at 520. 
 112. Id. at 523–24. 
 113. Id. at 547–48. 
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quently, he contends that just as the DPA’s persecutor bar was 
not limited to voluntary conduct, neither is the Refugee Act’s.114 
Justices Scalia and Alito concurred but clarified that the Board 
would be reasonable in concluding that the persecutor bar does 
not permit a duress defense.115 They stated that as a discretion-
ary matter, coerced persecutors may be “undesirable as immi-
grants”116 and that a “bright-line rule excluding all persecutors” 
could be preferable.117 These Justices suggest that while the 
agency may want to revise its interpretation to require 
knowledge of the consequences of one’s acts for the bar to apply, 
it should reject an exception for duress.118 Justices Stevens and 
Breyer concluded that the statute does not disqualify an immi-
grant whose conduct was coerced or the product of duress. The-
se Justices rely on the various international agreements in-
forming the Refugee Act and their interpretations by the 
United Nations and other Member States.119 Otherwise, in their 
view, the statute would impermissibly “treat entire classes of 
victims as persecutors.”120 
After nearly thirty years of decision-making, the agency is 
left with the conclusion that the meaning of “persecution” in 
the bar is ambiguous and must be construed first by the agen-
cy.121 With Chevron succeeding Fedorenko, and the use of the 
same ambiguous terms in the DPA, the agency can depart from 
Fedorenko’s rule as well.122 By doing so, the immigration agency 
could incorporate fundamental principles of liability, as de-
scribed by Massey and others, in its administration of the per-
secutor bar. Although the Justices vary on the domestic and in-
ternational sources of law that bear on the bar’s interpretation, 
 
 114. Id. at 548. 
 115. Id. at 525. 
 116. Id. at 527; see also Dienstag, supra note 16, at 128–32 (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s rationale in Fedorenko and the implications of the ruling); 
Massey, supra note 16, at 102 n.25 (noting that State Department officials in 
past cases have testified that they have the discretion to deny a visa to any 
immigrant who is not desirable). 
 117. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 527. 
 118. Id. at 528. 
 119. Id. at 535–38. 
 120. Id. at 535. 
 121. Id. at 524. 
 122. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 969 (2005) (providing that an agency can interpret a statute differ-
ently from a prior judicial construction so long as the statute’s terms are am-
biguous and the agency’s divergent reading is reasonable). 
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it is clear that the agency must consider their “weight and rele-
vance” in issuing its final rule. It is to these sources that the 
Article turns next. 
II.  RESURRECTING THE CULPABILITY REQUIREMENT 
IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
REFUGEE ORGANIZATION   
Fedorenko examined the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, 
which incorporated wholesale the eligibility provisions of the 
Constitution of the International Refugee Organization 
(IRO).123 The Fedorenko Court cited the use of the word “volun-
tarily” in one IRO exclusion but not a parallel exclusion as indi-
cia of congressional intent, and it relied on the testimony of one 
Foreign Service officer regarding the administration of the per-
secution-related exclusion. Original documents reveal that nei-
ther source provides the full story. 
The drafting history of the IRO’s Constitution illustrates 
two key elements of the drafters’ intent: an attempt to limit the 
number of individuals forced to return to their countries of 
origin (many of whom had fallen under communist control), 
and an understanding that the term “persecution” inherently 
requires willful action. Moreover, the eligibility directives given 
to IRO adjudicators and the decisions by an appellate review 
board reflect a far more nuanced application of the persecutor 
bar than that described in the Foreign Service officer’s testi-
mony. In this Part, I examine the drafting history of the IRO, 
the IRO Eligibility Directive and Eligibility Manuals, and the 
decisions of the IRO Eligibility Review Board. I contend that, in 
the absence of this history, both the Fedorenko Court and the 
BIA arrived at too broad a rule—one that excludes individuals 
who were never considered potential persecutors by the IRO. 
Rather, the first adjudicators of the persecutor bar treated the 
victims of Nazi persecution entirely apart from its perpetrators. 
They also looked for indicia of culpability—in the form of direct 
action, a position of authority, or membership in a persecutory 
group with no evidence of individual innocence of that group’s 
actions. 
Fedorenko’s broad conception of the original persecutor bar 
in U.S. law rested on the use of the terms “voluntarily” and 
 
 123. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 495 (1981); see also Dis-
placed Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 2(b), 62 Stat. 1009, 1009 
(1948). 
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“persecution” in the IRO Constitution, as adopted in the DPA. 
The Court looked at neither the drafting history nor the histor-
ical context when construing these terms and therefore missed 
the significance of both. The use of the word “voluntarily” in 
one exception but not the other turns out to say very little 
about the drafters’ conception of the persecutor bar, but instead 
reflects the emergence of Cold War politics and a fight between 
Eastern and Western countries over whether to protect or pun-
ish political dissidents. As such, the IRO provision concerning 
voluntary assistance serves as a faulty foil for the Court’s anal-
ysis of the persecutor bar in Fedorenko. More relevant to the 
bar’s meaning in the IRO Constitution, and thus the DPA, was 
the contemporary understanding of the term “persecution.” 
Section A uncovers the source of the term “voluntarily” and the 
meaning of “persecution” in order to supply the context that 
was missing in Fedorenko. In the end, though, the bar’s original 
scope is illuminated more by its application than by its terms. 
Section B addresses the evidence of how the bar was applied to 
victims of persecution and its perpetrators. 
A. THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TERMS 
“VOLUNTARILY” AND “PERSECUTION” 
After World War II, there were approximately 8,000,000 
people living outside their countries of nationality or places of 
residence.124 Many millions repatriated but at the end of 1946, 
there were still about 1,600,000 refugees throughout the world 
who did not want to return to their prior homes.125 In response 
to the unprecedented magnitude of the refugee population, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations created the Interna-
tional Refugee Organization (IRO) to repatriate, resettle, and 
provide basic services to refugees and displaced persons.126 Its 
mission was fundamentally humanitarian,127 and its creation 
and operation was led by the United States.128 
 
 124. Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], The Facts about Refugees, at 2 (1948) [here-
inafter IRO Facts]. 
 125. Id. at 4; HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 1 (estimating 1.5 million people). 
 126. IRO CONST. annex III, reprinted in 18 U.N., TREATY SERIES: TREATIES 
AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS REGISTERED OR FILED AND RECORDED 
WITH THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 23–24 (1948); G.A. Res. 283, 
U.N. Doc. A/45 (Feb. 12, 1946), reprinted in U.N., supra, at 23–24; HOLBORN, 
supra note 16, at 33. 
 127. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 53. 
 128. See GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: 
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The IRO was established through a resolution proposed by 
the United States.129 The resolution required an organization to 
separate the victims of World War II from its perpetrators. It 
began by “[r]ecognizing that the problem of refugees and dis-
placed persons of all categories is one of immediate urgency 
and recognizing the necessity of clearly distinguishing between 
genuine refugees and displaced persons on the one hand, and 
the war criminals, quislings, and traitors, on the other.”130 The 
General Assembly adopted this resolution and recommended 
that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) create a spe-
cial committee to examine the situation and report back to the 
Assembly.131 To protect victims of persecution, the resolution 
provided the special committee with a guiding principle that no 
refugee or displaced person with “valid objections” shall be 
“compelled to return to their countries of origin” and that the 
future of these persons “shall become the concern” of an inter-
national body created by the special committee.132 In contrast, 
with respect to perpetuators of harm, the resolution provides 
that no action should be taken that would “interfere in any way 
with the surrender and punishment of war criminals, quislings 
and traitors, in conformity with present or future international 
arrangements or agreements.”133 
A drafting committee was formed134 and met for nearly two 
months to create the Constitution for the IRO.135 The result was 
an international body that would provide services and protec-
tion to individuals who qualified under a series of definitions 
 
REFUGEES AND AMERICA’S HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 14–16 
(1986) (describing the United States’ hostility to the IRO’s precursor, the 
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), for its 
pro-Soviet position and outlining the Truman administration’s efforts to re-
place UNRRA with the Western-dominated IRO). 
 129. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 31–33. 
 130. G.A. Res. 283, supra note 126. A quisling is a “traitor who collaborates 
with an enemy force occupying their country.” Quisling, OXFORD DICTIONARY 
OF ENGLISH 1145 (Angus Stevenson ed., 3d ed. 2010). The term originated 
from the name of Major Vidkun Quisling (1887–1945), the Norwegian army 
officer and diplomat who ruled Norway on behalf of the German occupying 
forces from 1940–1945. Id. 
 131. Id. ¶ (b). 
 132. Id. ¶ (c)(ii). 
 133. Id. ¶ (d). 
 134. Economic and Social Council Res. 1/3, U.N. Doc. E/Res/5, ¶ 32(1)(b) 
(Feb. 16, 1946). 
 135. Econ. & Soc. Council, Rep. of the Special Comm. on Refugees and Dis-
placed Persons, at 1–5, U.N. Doc. E/Ref/75 (June 1, 1946). 
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and bars.136 The foundational requirement for these benefits 
was status as a “refugee” or “displaced person.” The Constitu-
tion defined the term “refugee” using four different categories: 
(1) individuals outside their former home countries who were 
victims of the Nazi regime or collaborating regimes, victims of 
the Falangist regime in Spain, or persons considered refugees 
before World War II; (2) a person outside his home country who 
is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
government; (3) German or Austrian Jews who were victims of 
Nazi persecution, who are living in Germany or Austria but 
have not firmly resettled; or (4) unaccompanied children who 
are war orphans and outside their countries of origin.137 The 
term “displaced person” applied to an individual who, through 
actions of a Nazi or fascist regime, “has been deported from, or 
has been obliged to leave his country of nationality or former 
habitual residence, such as persons who were compelled to un-
dertake forced labour or who were deported for racial, religious 
or political reasons.”138 
 
 136. Id. at 3. 
 137. IRO CONST. annex I, pt. I, § A, reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at 
18. More specifically, the text provided: 
1. . . . [A] person who has left, or who is outside of, his country of na-
tionality or of former habitual residence, and who . . . belongs to one 
of the following categories: 
(a) [V]ictims of the [N]azi or fascist regimes or of regimes which 
took part on their side in the second world war, or of the quisling 
or similar regimes which assisted them against the United Na-
tions, whether enjoying international status as refugees or not; 
(b) Spanish Republicans and other victims of the Falangist re-
gime in Spain, whether enjoying international status as refugees 
or not; 
(c) [P]ersons who were considered refugees before the outbreak of 
the second world war, for reasons of race, religion, nationality or 
political opinion. 
2. . . . [A] person, other than a displaced person . . . who is outside of 
his country of nationality or former habitual residence, and who, as a 
result of events subsequent to the outbreak of the second world war, 
is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the Gov-
ernment of his country of nationality or former nationality. 
3. . . . [P]ersons who, having resided in Germany or Austria, and be-
ing of Jewish origin or foreigners or stateless persons, were victims of 
[N]azi persecution and were detained in, or were obliged to flee from, 
and were subsequently returned to, one of those countries as a result 
of enemy action, or of war circumstances, and have not yet been firm-
ly resettled therein. 
4. . . . [U]naccompanied children who are war orphans or whose par-
ents have disappeared, and who are outside their countries of origin. 
Id. 
 138. Id. annex I, pt. I, § B.  
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Not all refugees and displaced persons were eligible for 
services, however. Rather, only those refugees and displaced 
persons who were “the concern of the Organization” could qual-
ify. A refugee or displaced person fell within this group if she 
could be repatriated but needed assistance from the IRO to do 
so, or if she had expressed “valid objections” to returning to her 
home country due to “(i) persecution, or fear, based on reasona-
ble grounds of persecution because of race, religion, nationality 
or political opinions”; (ii) valid political objections; or (iii) “com-
pelling family reasons arising out of previous persecution, . . . 
infirmity or illness.”139 However, the IRO Constitution did not 
require Spanish Republicans (and other victims of the 
Falangist regime) or Jewish victims of Nazi persecution living 
in Germany or Austria to establish a valid objection to return-
ing to Spain or staying in Germany or Austria in order to be-
come a concern of the IRO.140 These individuals were eligible for 
services based on their status as victims alone. Broadly stated, 
status as a victim of past persecution by the Nazis or other fas-
cist regimes, fear of future persecution, or family complications 
due to past persecution or poor health would meet the require-
ments for avoiding forced repatriation, and in the case of Jew-
ish Germans or Austrians residing in those countries, past per-
secution alone would allow for resettlement. 
In addition to defining who was included, the IRO Consti-
tution also defined who was excluded. The first version of the 
Constitution excluded: 
(a) War criminals, quislings and traitors 
(b) Any other persons who have voluntarily and actively assisted the 
enemy forces since the outbreak of the second world war in their op-
erations against the United Nations or in persecuting the civil popu-
lation.141 
This formulation of the persecutor bar was brought to the 
full drafting committee. Some delegations raised concern over 
the inclusion of the words “voluntarily and actively” because 
“they posed an impossible standard since no quisling would 
 
 139. Id. annex I, pt. I, § C(1). 
 140. Id. (exempting refugees and displaced persons from the additional re-
quirement of providing a valid objection to be a concern of the IRO); id. ¶ 1(f) 
(indicating refugees and displaced persons are the concern of the IRO); id. an-
nex I, pt. I, § A(1)(b), A(3) (defining these groups as refugees). 
 141. Econ. & Soc. Council, Special Comm. on Refugees and Displaced Per-
sons, Sub-Committee on Definitions: Report of the Chairman, at 22, U.N. Doc. 
E/Ref/65 (May 8, 1946). 
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admit to having voluntarily or actively assisted the enemy.”142 
Other delegates were concerned that without this qualification 
“persons who had been coerced into service with the Germans 
or who had given only passive type of assistance” would be dis-
qualified from IRO services and that “there were great num-
bers of persons in former enemy-occupied territory who had 
found themselves in such circumstances.”143 In response, a new 
formulation was adopted that separated participants in perse-
cution of civil populations from participants in enemy forces, 
specifying that only voluntary participation in enemy forces 
would be a barrier. A specific exclusion for past persecutors 
was created and the burden was shifted to the applicant to 
show that assistance to the enemy was involuntary: 
Any other persons who have assisted the enemy in persecuting the 
civil population of any of the United Nations or who have assisted the 
enemy forces since the outbreak of the second World War in their op-
erations against the United Nations, unless it can be established that 
such assistance was not given voluntarily or was of a purely humani-
tarian or non-military nature.144 
The use of the word “voluntarily” continued to be the sub-
ject of debate as it applied to former soldiers serving in enemy 
forces.145 These objections were usually raised by the Soviet del-
 
 142. Econ. & Soc. Council, Special Comm. on Refugees and Displaced Per-
sons, Summary Record of the Thirty-Fourth and Thirty-Fifth Meetings, at 6, 
U.N. Doc. E/Ref/78 (May 20, 1946). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. The amendment was proposed by the U.K. and Soviet delegates; 
however, the Soviet delegate later objected to the “voluntarily” language. 
Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. of the Whole on Refugees and Displaced Persons, 
Summary Record of the Fourth Meeting, at 4–5, U.N. Doc. E/80 (June 18, 
1946). The British delegate noted that the phrase had been inserted with the 
agreement of the Soviet delegation “to ensure assistance to those in the occu-
pied countries who had had to assist the enemy indirectly in order to enable 
themselves and their families to survive. This was the case of the majority of 
the occupied peoples who had continued their civilian occupation as bakers, 
doctors, etc., even if that partly involved assistance to the enemy.” Id. at 5.  
 145. The Ukrainian delegate supported the Soviet faction, asserting that 
the word “voluntarily” was unnecessary—stating that “the word ‘collaboration’ 
implied that the act was a voluntary one and that there could be no question, 
therefore of ‘forced collaboration.’” Comm. of the Whole on Refugees and Dis-
placed Persons, supra note 144, at 5. The draft constitution under review did 
not contain the word “collaboration,” however. Rather, the Ukrainian repre-
sentative—using the word “collaboration” instead of “voluntary”—seemed to 
be referring to discussions within the General Assembly, which were given to 
the drafting committee. See Econ. & Soc. Council, Documents for the Special 
Committee on Refugees and Displaces Persons, U.N. Doc. E/Ref/1 (Jan. 28, 
1946). These meetings reflected a repeated concern that war criminals and 
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egation and often supported by the Yugoslav, Czechoslovakian, 
Polish, and Ukrainian delegations. They occurred in the con-
text of a larger divide between these delegations and Western 
governments over who would be forced to return to their coun-
tries of origin.146 These disagreements were most acute in dis-
cussions of protection for political dissidents, many of whom 
were prisoners of war from Eastern bloc countries, forced to 
serve in German units after the Nazi surge of 1941, and who 
were hostile to the communist governments put in place in 
their home countries after World War II. As the rapporteur for 
the Special Committee explained, labor shortages in the refu-
gees’ countries of origin prompted both a desire by these gov-
ernments to secure the return of all their nationals to their ter-
ritory, and objections to “subsidiz[ing] indirectly the opponents 
of the regime they represent.”147 Eastern governments asserted 
that dissidents should be excluded from refugee protection be-
cause they were subject to punishment in their home countries 
as political enemies, and that they were also encouraging other 
refugees not to return.148 As a result, these countries objected to 
the word “voluntarily” because it would limit the number of 
former soldiers from the Soviet Union and Eastern European 
countries who would be ineligible for resettlement under the 
IRO Constitution—and thus forced to return to their countries 
of origin—to only those soldiers who volunteered to serve in 
Nazi forces. The Communist governments of these countries in-
stead wanted all conscripted soldiers to be ineligible for reset-
tlement so that they would be forced to return to their coun-
tries of origin. Their objections ultimately proved unsuccessful, 
however.149 In the end, the term “voluntarily” was directed at 
 
their “collaborators” did not receive any benefits from the new organization. 
Id. at 8–11, 17–23, 46. 
 146. These delegations asserted the position in the early General Assembly 
debates concerning the resolution that created the IRO, that all displaced per-
sons could return home, that those refusing to return to their homes after four 
months should not receive international assistance in the camps, and that the 
countries of origin should consent to any resettlement of their citizens. See 
HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 30–33. 
 147. Econ. & Soc. Council, supra note 135, at 3. 
 148. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 37–38; Rep. of the Special Comm. on Ref-
ugees and Displaced Persons, supra note 135, at 3–4, 14–17. 
 149. Econ. & Soc. Council, Draft Constitution for the International Refugee 
Organization, 3d Sess., 14th mtg., at 93, U.N. Doc. E/161/Rev.2 (Sept. 30, 
1946). Individuals who supported the use of force against member govern-
ments or served as leaders in opposition movements were, however, excluded. 
IRO CONST. annex I, pt. II, ¶ 6(a)–(b), reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at 21. 
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those who assisted enemy forces in their general operations be-
cause many people served in these forces only under “duress.”150 
Western delegates prevailed in their desire to help these former 
soldiers flee what had become Communist countries. As a re-
sult of this language, which allowed former soldiers from the 
Soviet Union, Poland, and Yugoslavia, along with their fami-
lies, to escape forced repatriation based on their objections to 
the Communist governments now in place there, these coun-
tries refused to join the IRO and made no contribution to its 
operation.151 
The term “persecution” also played a key role in the IRO 
Constitution and was understood at the time to require an ele-
ment of deliberateness. The IRO Constitution was the first in-
ternational refugee agreement to use the term “persecution.”152 
“Persecution” appears in three provisions of the IRO Constitu-
tion: as part of the “refugee” definition;153 as a “valid objection” 
to repatriation;154 and as a bar to eligibility.155 The term ap-
peared in the British Aliens Act of 1905.156 In this statute, Brit-
ain protected immigrants who sought admission to avoid “per-
secution, involving danger of imprisonment or danger to life or 
limb on account of religious belief.”157 The term also appeared in 
other IRO precursors, such as the writings that informed the 
League of Nations policies respecting refugees158 and the 1938 
Evian Conference that created the Intergovernmental Commit-
tee on Refugees.159 In each of these contexts, “persecution” is 
 
 150. Rejecting another Soviet effort to delete the word “voluntarily” as it 
applied to assisting enemy forces, the French delegation explained that many 
people were “forced to serve under duress,” including many French soldiers. 
Econ. & Soc. Council, Discussion of Amendments to the Draft Constitution of 
the International Refugee Organization, 3d Sess., 13th mtg., at 90, U.N. Doc. 
E/161/Rev.2 (Sept. 30, 1946). The U.S. representative agreed “that a guilty 
person could make claims of having acted under duress, but this did not imply 
that the Organization would accept such claims injudiciously.” Id. 
 151. See LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 128, at 16. 
 152. Jane McAdam, Rethinking the Origins of ‘Persecution’ in Refugee Law, 
25 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 667, 668 (2013). 
 153. IRO CONST. annex I, pt. I, § A(3), reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at 
18. 
 154. Id. annex I, pt. I, § C(1)(a)(i). 
 155. Id. annex I, pt. I, § C(1)(a)(iii). 
 156. McAdam, supra note 152, at 667–68. 
 157. Id. at 668 (quoting the Aliens Act 1905, 5 Edw. c. 13, § 1(3)(d) (Gr. 
Brit.)). 
 158. Id. at 667–71. 
 159. The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) was estab-
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used to describe a “deliberate policy” or “official measures” with 
an “acknowledged aim” to compel Jews or political dissidents to 
flee.160 The discussions of persecution and refugee protection 
preceding the drafting of the IRO Constitution reflect a com-
mon understanding of “persecution” as an intentional policy on 
the part of a government aimed at forcing undesirable citizens 
to flee that country.161 The drafters of the IRO Constitution not 
only built on these agreements using a core term that designat-
ed deliberate and willful action, they also explicitly protected 
individuals already designated as “refugees” under the prior in-
itiatives by virtue of their persecution, as that term was under-
stood at the time. 
In the end, the General Assembly adopted a formulation 
that disqualified from services and resettlement: 
1. War criminals, quislings
 
and traitors. 
2. Any other persons who can be shown: 
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations of 
countries, Members of the United Nations; or 
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the out-
break of the second world war in their operations against the 
United Nations. 
3. Ordinary criminals who are extraditable by treaty.162 
 
lished at the Evian Conference in 1938 to “help victims of [N]azi persecution in 
Germany and Austria, providing for their legal protection, maintenance and 
resettlement.” The International Refugee Organization, 1946–47 U.N.Y.B. 807, 
U.N. Sales No. 1947 L18. 
 160. See McAdam, supra note 152, at 672–73 (discussing the work of Hope 
Simpson, R. Jennings, and Louise Holborn). 
 161. See id. at 672–82. 
 162. IRO CONST. annex I, pt. II, ¶ 6, reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at 
21. The Constitution contained additional exclusions for: 
4. Persons of German ethnic origin, whether German nationals or 
members of German minorities in other countries, who: 
(a) have been or may be transferred to Germany from other coun-
tries; 
(b) have been during the second world war, evacuated from Ger-
many to other countries; 
(c) have fled from, or into, Germany, or from their places of resi-
dence into countries other than Germany in order to avoid falling 
into the hands of Allied armies. 
5. Persons who are in receipt of financial support and protection from 
their country of nationality, unless their country of nationality re-
quests international assistance for them. 
6. Persons who, since the end of hostilities in the second world war: 
(a) have participated in any organization having as one of its 
purposes the overthrow by armed force of the Government of 
their country of origin, being a Member of the United Nations; or 
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But, without recorded discussion, the General Assembly 
included a footnote at the end of section 2(b) that referenced 
both “civil populations” from 2(a) and “voluntary assistance” 
from 2(b), stating: 
Mere continuance of normal and peaceful duties, not performed with 
the specif ic purpose of aiding the enemy against the Allies or against 
the civil population of territory in enemy occupation, shall not be con-
sidered to constitute “voluntary assistance.” Nor shall acts of general 
humanity, such as care of wounded or dying, be so considered except 
in cases where help of this nature given to enemy nationals could 
equally well have been given to Allied nationals and was purposely 
withheld from them.163 
Ultimately, the drafters’ use of the word “voluntarily” in one of 
the bars for assisting enemy forces but not the other reflected a 
geopolitical struggle over former soldiers and political dissi-
dents who were citizens of countries with post-War communist 
governments (and who did not want to return to those coun-
tries), and the refusal of Western countries to send them back. 
Over the objections of the Eastern bloc countries, the word 
“voluntarily” was used to ensure that conscripted soldiers and 
prisoners of war would not be forced to return to their home 
countries if they had political objections to the governments in 
place after the war. In contrast, the term “persecution” had al-
ready acquired a common meaning from its use in prior refugee 
documents. The isolated use of the term “voluntarily” does not 
reflect a policy choice to exclude all who assisted in the perse-
cution of others from IRO coverage, regardless of circumstance, 
because the term “persecution” already required deliberate, in-
tentional, and direct action. The practice of IRO adjudicators in 
administering the bar confirms this view. 
 
the overthrow by armed force of the Government of any other 
Member of the United Nations, or have participated in any ter-
rorist organization; 
(b) have become leaders of movements hostile to the Government 
of their country of origin being a Member of the United Nations 
or sponsors of movements encouraging refugees not to return to 
their country of origin; 
(c) at the time of application for assistance, are in the military or 
civil service of a foreign State. 
Id. 
 163. G.A. Res. 62 (I), at 97–98 (Dec. 15, 1946); IRO CONST. annex I, pt. II, 
¶ 2(b), reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at 20. The Constitution provided that 
it would come into force when at least fifteen States who were responsible for 
seventy-five percent of the operating budget had become parties to the Consti-
tution. Id. art. 18. 
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B. A QUEST FOR CULPABILITY BY IRO ADJUDICATORS 
Documents preserved in the French National Archive re-
veal the evolving guidelines for assessing an applicant’s eligi-
bility and the eligibility analysis of individual applications in a 
selection of cases adjudicated by the IRO.164 Most significantly, 
these sources show that the persecutor bar was not applied to 
individuals who were victims of persecution themselves. They 
also demonstrate a standard that required indicia of culpability 
and allowed individuals to provide exculpatory evidence 
demonstrating individual innocence despite their membership 
in a unit known to have committed atrocities with a primarily 
voluntary membership. Indeed, in many ways, the IRO adjudi-
cators measured individual responsibility for the actions of the 
group using the criteria Massey suggested.165 
The IRO Constitution provided for a semi-judicial process 
to ensure the impartial and equitable application of the organi-
 
 164. The French National Archive, located in Pierrefitte-sur-Seine, houses 
the documents preserved from the IRO. A description of the history of this col-
lection, its contents, and a general index is available in French on the French 
National Archive website. ARCHIVES NATIONALES FRANCE, http://www 
.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/chan/chan/pdf/AJ43_2009.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2016). Nearly all documents concerning the IRO are in English—the 
only exceptions being some letters and a handful of the Eligibility Review 
Board decisions. The collection is public but can only be inspected in person. In 
June 2014, I reviewed the contents of the following boxes in the Archive: 102–
08, 131–32, 140–49, 169, 184–94, 303, 412, 424–25, 451–52, 457, 476–49, 481–
93, 497, 567–69, 573–74, 650. These boxes contain copies of all of the policy 
directives, eligibility decisions in individual cases, meeting summaries, corre-
spondence between IRO leadership, and periodic reports of the IRO’s opera-
tions that have been preserved. I photographed every decision, every commu-
nication among the leadership or to field officers regarding eligibility, the 
periodic operational reports, resolutions taken by the Executive Committee 
bearing on eligibility, and the documents discussing the retention of materials 
after the close of the IRO. These files are labeled based on the box in which 
they were contained in the Archive. Thus, all file names begin with “AJ 43” as 
that corresponds to the designation for the IRO collection in the French Na-
tional Archive. See id. The next number in the file name corresponds to the 
box number also referenced in the index. Thus, the file name “AJ # 43 131” in-
dicates that the document was contained in box 131 of the IRO collection. Fi-
nally, I numbered each photograph for identification purposes. This Article 
includes citation parentheticals to reference the relevant photograph(s) in my 
collection. With the expert research assistance of Jordan Hogness, all of the 
individual decisions were sorted by the constitutional provision(s) cited in each 
decision as the reason the person (or family) was included in or excluded from 
the concern of the IRO. 
 165. Massey, supra note 16, at 98, 145–47. 
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zation’s mandate and eligibility criteria.166 This requirement 
gave rise to the Review Board for Eligibility Appeals.167 The Re-
view Board served as an independent appellate body that re-
viewed challenges from persons whom IRO eligibility field of-
ficers deemed not to be the concern of the organization.168 It 
also advised the IRO Director General on larger eligibility 
questions.169 
The IRO’s Executive Committee and Eligibility Review 
Board issued a series of documents that reflect a requirement 
for personal culpability through references to war crimes liabil-
ity and the use of exculpatory evidence. The IRO leadership is-
sued an Eligibility Directive in June 1947 and Eligibility Man-
uals in 1947, 1949, and 1950.170 The 1947 Directive is quite 
basic and describes the provisions of the IRO Constitution 
along with the procedures for processing individual applicants 
and instructions on the forms to use.171 The three manuals, 
however, provide guidance on the meaning of the IRO provi-
sions and discussion of the activities of different groups associ-
ated with the Nazis in order to educate field officers on the 
particular eligibility issues for applicants from these groups.172 
 
 166. IRO CONST. annex I, ¶ 2, reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, at 18. 
 167. Exec. Sec’y of Preparatory Comm’n, supra note 54, at 45; HOLBORN, 
supra note 16, at 208. 
 168. Exec. Sec’y of the Preparatory Comm’n, supra note 54, at 45–46. 
 169. Id. at 45; Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Constitution of Review Board for 
Eligibility Appeals, Doc. GC/65 (Mar. 26, 1949), reprinted in HOLBORN, supra 
note 16, at 213; HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 208. 
 170. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 207 (providing an explanation of the IRO 
manuals); Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Manual for Eligibility Officers, No. 241 
(1950) [hereinafter 1950 Manual]; Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Provisional Order 
No. 42.1, app. (Aug. 6, 1949) [hereinafter 1949 Manual] (on file with the Na-
tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 148, 185–89) (photo copy on file with author, 
43 148 (v.2) 001–252, 43 148 026–49, 43 185–89 001–04); Int’l Refugee Org. 
[IRO], Preparatory Comm’n, Provisional Order No. 42, apps. (Dec. 31, 1947) 
[hereinafter 1947 Manual] (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 185–89) (photo copy on file with author, 047–93); Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], 
Eligibility Directive PCIRO, FI/3 (June 25, 1947) [hereinafter 1947 Directive] 
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 146–47) (photo copy on 
file with author, 001–16). The 1950 Manual was cited by the Supreme Court in 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438 n.20 (1987), as providing guidance 
regarding the meaning of “refugee” in the U.N. Convention and Protocol as 
that term was taken from the IRO Constitution. 
 171. 1947 Directive, supra note 170. 
 172. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 51–106 (discussing activities of vari-
ous groups by country of origin and eligibility issues for each); HOLBORN, su-
pra note 16, at 207 (explaining that the 1950 Manual includes case excerpts to 
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The Manuals of 1949 and 1950 also include case excerpts from 
the Review Board to illustrate the application of the various 
provisions.173 
Beginning with the Eligibility Manual issued at the end of 
1947, the persecutor bar was explained in conjunction with the 
exclusion of war criminals. The Manual described the war crim-
inals provision as excluding anyone who committed acts that 
constituted war crimes under international law.174 These were 
summarized as: 
(a) Crimes against peace (i.e. those who have planned aggressive 
war). 
(b) [V]iolations of the accepted rules of warfare (i.e. murder of prison-
ers, murder of hostages and other crimes of which there is a list of 
about 20). 
(c) Crimes against humanity (e.g. internment of civilians in inhuman 
conditions, extermination of Jews in gas chambers, etc.).175 
The crimes corresponded to the offenses defined in the 
Charter of the International Military Tribunal.176 Anyone 
charged with war crimes was excluded from IRO assistance un-
til the accusing government cleared the charges.177 Officers 
were directed to refer an applicant suspected of criminal activi-
ty to the regional IRO headquarters which maintained a com-
plete list of suspects.178 The Manual explained that “the guiding 
rules laid down in respect of war criminals” apply to the addi-
tional exclusion for “persons who can be shown . . . to have as-
sisted the enemy in persecuting civil populations” and that the-
 
serve as guides). The 1949 Manual also included discussion of the eligibility 
issues of various groups, which was repeated and updated in the 1950 Manual. 
1949 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 148) (photo copy on file with author, 119–82). 
 173. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 207 (discussing Review Board case ex-
cerpts included in the 1950 Manual). Compare Avsic, 93.731, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 2218 BA-251 (Sept. 3, 1948) 
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 478) (photo copy on file 
with author, 024–25), with 1949 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with the Na-
tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy on file with author, 038). 
 174. 1947 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 185–89) (photo copy on file with author, 076). 
 175. Id.  
 176. 1 INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 11 (1947). 
 177. 1947 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 185–89) (photo copy on file with author, 076). 
 178. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 185–89) (pho-
to copy on file with author, 077). 
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se persons’ names generally appear on the United Nations’ 
lists.179 The Manual stated further that when an individual’s 
name does not appear on the United Nations’ lists but “is gen-
erally considered by his countrymen as having been guilty of 
persecution” and where the eligibility officer “has no reason to 
doubt their good faith,” the officer should gather all available 
information and consult with the governing authority or re-
gional headquarters before making a decision.180 The Review 
Board did not alter this guidance in subsequent editions.181 
The only example of the application of the persecutor bar 
provided in the Manuals involved a Slovenian applicant.182 In 
this case, the Review Board consulted the lists created by the 
Special Refugee Screening Commission, which was entrusted 
by the British government to screen Yugoslav enemy personnel 
in Italy and Austria.183 The Commission used the IRO exclu-
sionary grounds to classify individuals and then made those 
lists available to the Review Board and field officers.184 The ap-
plicant’s name was contained on the Commission’s “black” list 
which corresponded to the category of “war criminals, traitors, 
or Quislings” who were wanted by the Yugoslav government.185 
The case excerpt also explained that the Review Board had ob-
tained “from a reliable source” information that the applicant 
was part of a quisling militia and had participated in the ar-
rests, detentions, and ill-treatment of three different individu-
als, including one woman who was sent to Auschwitz as the re-
sult of the arrest.186 The Review Board concluded that the 
applicant was excluded under the provisions for war criminals 
as well as for other persons who have assisted the enemy in 
 
 179. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 185–89) (pho-
to copy on file with author, 078). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 31–33; 1949 Manual, supra note 
170 (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy on 
file with author, 043). 
 182. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 31(I); 1949 Manual, supra note 170, 
at 43(i) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy 
on file with author, 038). 
 183. See 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 88 (describing the Special Refu-
gee Screening Commission, also known as the Maclean Commission); see also 
HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 208 (noting that the Special Refugee Commission 
was headed by Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean). 
 184. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 88. 
 185. Id. at 31(I). 
 186. Id. 
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persecuting civil populations.187 The Manuals’ description of the 
persecutor bar and its sole example tie the persecutor bar to 
conduct prosecuted as crimes against humanity and to the as-
sociated requirement of culpability. 
In practice, the persecutor bar was more commonly applied 
alongside the bar for voluntarily assisting enemy forces in their 
operations against the United Nations.188 The guidance 
 
 187. Id.; IRO CONST. annex I, pt. II, ¶¶ (1), (2)(a), reprinted in U.N., supra 
note 126, at 20; see 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 31(I); 1949 Manual, supra 
note 170, at 43(i) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) 
(photo copy on file with author, 038). 
 188. The example, Avsic, 93.731, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva 2218 BA-251 (Sept. 3, 1948) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 478) (photo copy on file with author, 024–25), in-
cluded in the 1949 and 1950 Manuals was the only case preserved in the Ar-
chive that applied both the war criminals bar and persecutor bar. See 1950 
Manual, supra note 170, at 31(I); 1949 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with 
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy on file with author, 
038). Of the seventy-five decisions preserved in the Archive that discuss the 
persecutor bar, thirty-three excluded individuals on the basis of both bars and 
six reversed the application of the bar in favor of the voluntary assistance bar. 
See Zubrickas, 84.811, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva 871 (Aug. 1, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 132–33) (reversing persecutor bar 
applied in previous decision for lack of substantiation by Jewish Central 
Committee and including petitioner within mandate); Porpaczy, 995.459, Int’l 
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 8716 K.1174 (June 28, 
1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on 
file with author, 041–42) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting en-
emy forces); Skaistlauks, 692800/8800, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of 
the Review Board, WA-1073/KK.848 (June 12, 1950) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with author, 039) (excluded 
under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Aule, 3395, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 11676 (June 1, 1950) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 043) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); 
Bliumfeldas, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 
DS/161 (May 22, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
485) (photo copy on file with author, 010–11) (excluding petitioner under per-
secutor bar only); Beregfy, N 23191, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva 22223 NA – 1079 HT/N/426 (May 20, 1950) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 477) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 009) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); 
Czorba, 774706, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Gene-
va HT/N/549 (May 20, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 034) (excluded under persecutor bar 
only); Zern, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, (May 19, 
1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on 
file with author, 042) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy 
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forces); Lehmann, 23955, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva NA – 1283 HT/N/464 (May 19, 1950) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 057) (excluded 
under persecutor bar only); Artinow, 1919, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision 
of the Review Board, Geneva DS/62 (May 12, 1950) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 026–27) (ex-
cluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Limion, N - 
23958, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva NA – 
1152 HT/N/399 (May 10, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 054) (excluded under persecutor bar 
and for assisting enemy forces); Pusic, 3313, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision 
of the Review Board, Geneva DS/132 (May 10, 1950) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 020–21) (ex-
cluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Eichelis, N 
22473, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva NA – 
1082 HT/N/346 (May 8, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 025) (excluded under persecutor bar 
and for assisting enemy forces); Temifrjen, 1.043.414/3, Int’l Refugee Org. 
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva L/A 261 (May 08, 1950) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # AJ 43 486) (photo copy on file with 
author, 016) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Weber, 1,040.101/4, Int’l 
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva L/A 227 (May 8, 
1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on 
file with author, 018) (excluded under persecutor bar and as ethnic German); 
Turgzyn, 81.274, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Ge-
neva 5569 (Apr. 19, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 107) (reversing persecutor bar finding 
and including petitioner within the Mandate); Tratsh, 942236, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva MA – 496 EK/523 (Apr. 5, 
1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on 
file with author, 010) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy 
forces); Fuchs, 1.013.173, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva HT/W/115 (Mar. 30, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 121) (excluded under per-
secutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Ginters, 252157, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 15971 (Mar. 24, 1950) (on 
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 477) (photo copy on file with 
author, 016–17) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forc-
es); Vamos, MI-481, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva MA-409/EK.370 (Mar. 24, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with author, 013) (excluded under per-
secutor bar only); Schmeta, 10327, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva MA-490 KK/367 (Mar. 24, 1950) (on file with the Na-
tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 047) 
(reversing persecutor bar finding; excluding petitioner for voluntarily assisting 
enemy forces); Abdourahaman, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Re-
view Board, Geneva 3538 (Feb. 13, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 052) (excluded under per-
secutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Nigeli, 1056489/1, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva KK/153 (Feb. 07, 1950) (on 
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with 
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author, 004) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); 
Kutilin, 97.652, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Gene-
va KK/115 (Feb. 3, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
484) (photo copy on file with author, 003) (excluded under persecutor bar and 
for assisting enemy forces); Bajraktarevic, 1.000.084, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], 
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva KK/30 (Jan. 27, 1950) (on file with the 
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with author, 005) 
(excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Handler, 
1,004.075, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 
KK/9 (Jan. 25, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 484) 
(photo copy on file with author, 006) (excluded under persecutor bar and for 
assisting enemy forces); Major, 529, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva 15960 (Jan. 24, 1950) (on file with the National Archive 
of France, AJ # 43 476) (photo copy on file with author, 07–08) (excluded under 
persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Reizas, 995.080, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 10831 (Jan. 16, 1950) (on 
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with 
author, 053) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Petrovs, 12186, Int’l Refu-
gee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 15802 NA 1179/B (Dec. 
15, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo 
copy on file with author, 001) (not a bona fide refugee or displaced person); 
Djuric, 2571, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 
17600 K-39 (Dec. 6, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
482) (photo copy on file with author, 025) (reversing persecutor bar finding; 
excluding petitioner for assisting enemy forces); Tidemanis, 3377, Int’l Refu-
gee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 11.675 K-20 (Dec. 2, 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on 
file with author, 034) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy 
forces); Barbath, 998.479, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva LP/12 (Nov. 23, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 134) (photo copy on file with author, 019) (excluded under per-
secutor bar only); Zubrickas, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva 8710 K.1043 (Nov. 16, 1949) (on file with the National Archive 
of France, AJ # 43 143) (photo copy on file with author, 076) (excluded under 
persecutor bar only); Urm, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board (Nov. 9, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) 
(photo copy on file with author, 004) (excluded under persecutor bar and for 
assisting enemy forces); Kauls, MI-457 M-361, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Deci-
sion of the Review Board, Geneva 14998 MA-365 K.0261 (Nov. 8, 1949) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 071) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); 
Sora, 101.680, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 
B INN- 68 (Oct. 27, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
181) (photo copy on file with author, 053) (no valid objection); Miriuka, Int’l 
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board (Oct. 24, 1949) (on file with 
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author, 
023) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Valancic, 
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board (Oct. 10, 1949) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 008) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); 
Janota, 815784, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Gene-
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va WA – 435/K (Oct. 8, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 060) (excluded under persecutor bar 
only); Spanic, 6448, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva 15765 WA – 214/K K.0011 (Sept. 30, 1949) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 009) (reversing 
persecutor bar finding; excluding petitioner for assisting enemy forces); 
Kalaba, 6422, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 
WA – 22/K K.0003 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 019) (excluded under per-
secutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Becic, 6398, Int’l Refugee Org. 
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva WA – 213/K K0009 (Sept. 29, 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on 
file with author, 020) (reversing persecutor bar finding; excluding petitioner 
for assisting enemy forces); Veladic, 6452, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of 
the Review Board, Geneva 15763 WA – 212/K K.0005 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 011) (reversing persecutor bar finding; excluding petitioner for assisting 
enemy forces); [name illegible], 97.631, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of 
the Review Board, Geneva 9986 (Sept. 16, 1949) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 046) (excluded 
under persecutor bar only); Vejo, 6450, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of 
the Review Board, Geneva WA – 219/K K.0002 (Sept. 9, 1949) (on file with the 
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 025) 
(reversing persecutor bar finding; excluding petitioner for assisting enemy 
forces); Kanminskij, 81 269/3, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva 8855 (Aug. 30, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 045) (excluded under per-
secutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Rada, 88.042, Int’l Refugee Org. 
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 5557 (Aug. 3, 1949) (on file with 
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 056) (reversing prior decision’s application of persecutor bar and includ-
ing petitioner within the Mandate); Vehlaid, 6569, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], 
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 9272/293/F (July 27, 1949) (on file with 
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author, 
006) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Tiesenhausen, 2962, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 12387 KC/2962 (July 15, 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on 
file with author, 009) (excluded under persecutor bar and as ethnic German); 
Kappaurs, 2377, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Ge-
neva 12363 (July 8, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
479) (photo copy on file with author, 002) (excluded under persecutor bar and 
for assisting enemy forces); Jurkus, 1419, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of 
the Review Board, Geneva 6007 (July 2, 1949) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 057) (excluded 
under persecutor bar only); Putnieks, 298633, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Deci-
sion of the Review Board, Geneva 9227 BB.2833 (June 22, 1949) (on file with 
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 
042) (included within the Mandate); Stauga, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision 
of the Review Board, Geneva 11251 B.B.2835 (June 22, 1949) (on file with the 
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 031–
32) (included within the Mandate); Aleksander, 2051, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], 
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Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 9273 NA-290/P (May 27, 1949) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 005) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Krajnc, 88.809, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva K.1145 (Apr. 13, 1949) (on 
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with 
author, 075) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Mixrut, 98.327, Int’l Refu-
gee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 9925 TK-171 (Mar. 29, 1949) (on 
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with 
author, 016) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); 
Simon, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 2997 
(Mar. 12, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) 
(photo copy on file with author, 061–62) (excluded under persecutor bar and 
for assisting enemy forces); Jakab, 997.012/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Deci-
sion of the Review Board, Geneva LA. 651 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the Na-
tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 057) (in-
cluded within the Mandate); Banfai, 999.048/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], 
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva LA.626 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the 
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 017) 
(reversing persecutor bar finding; including petitioner within the IRO Man-
date); Bertok, 996.401/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva LA.628 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 021) (included within the 
Mandate); Stranak, 771089, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva WA – 464/K.0033 (Mar. 10, 1949) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 021) (reversing 
persecutor bar; excluding petitioner as not a bona fide refugee or displaced 
person); Orlowsky, 11365, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva NA-211/K (Feb. 9, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 024) (excluded under per-
secutor bar only); Klein, 280, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva Aug A – 251/K (Jan. 31, 1949) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 054) (excluded 
under persecutor bar and as ethnic German); Slemr, 11546, Int’l Refugee Org. 
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva AA – 91/K (Jan. 27, 1949) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 055) (excluded under persecutor bar, for assisting enemy forces, and for 
being an ethnic German); Vrankovic, 996.301, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Deci-
sion of the Review Board, Geneva LA 336 (Jan. 27, 1949) (on file with the Na-
tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 120) 
(excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Mesnikoff, 
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 3079 (Jan. 11, 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on 
file with author, 066) (excluded under persecutor bar only); Franic, Int’l Refu-
gee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva B.I. 104 (Dec. 8, 1948) 
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 478) (photo copy on file 
with author, 065–66) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy 
forces); Szylasy, WA-31/K, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva 1796 (Nov. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 161) (excluded under per-
secutor bar only); Ausiura, 83.736, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva K.647 (Nov. 3, 1948) (on file with the National Archive 
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included in the Manuals on the nature of the membership and 
activities of various groups drove these decisions. This guidance 
evolved based on information that emerged through post-war 
activities and was expanded with each edition.189 However, all 
versions of the Manual designated members of certain groups 
only as prima facie ineligible, allowing individual applicants to 
rebut the presumption with evidence of individual innocence of 
the acts perpetrated by these groups. 
For example, according to the 1947 Eligibility Manual, Es-
tonian, Lithuanian, and Latvian applicants who joined the mil-
itary after 1943 were considered eligible for benefits because 
conscription was said to have begun in January 1943.190 The 
Manual made an exception for those who served in the German 
SS because of its voluntary nature and for “members of units 
notorious for atrocities unless they can prove that they were 
individually innocent.”191 Members of the Baltic Waffen SS 
units were initially considered conscripts and potentially eligi-
 
of France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 013–14) (excluded un-
der persecutor bar and for assisting enemy forces); Niemann, 4522, Int’l Refu-
gee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Wurzburg WA-117/p (Nov. 2, 
1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on 
file with author, 012) (excluded under persecutor bar and for assisting enemy 
forces); Rada, 88.048, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva K.711 (Nov. 2, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 057) (excluded under persecutor 
bar); Marincak, 84.444, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva K 559 (Oct. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 010) (excluded under 
persecutor bar only); Pauer, 84.477, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva K 558 (Oct. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive 
of France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 045) (excluded un-
der persecutor bar only); Avsic, 93.731, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of 
the Review Board, Geneva 2218 BA-251 (Sept. 3, 1948) (on file with the Na-
tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 478) (photo copy on file with author, 024–25) 
(excluded under bar for war criminals/quislings and persecutor bar); Muller, 
81.251/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 273 
(July 5, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142–43) 
(photo copy on file with author, 029) (reversing persecutor bar; excluding peti-
tioner as ethnic German). 
 189. From the start, the IRO leadership recognized that the determination 
of eligibility “is necessarily, a continuous process because of additional infor-
mation received” and eventual reduction in need for resettlement services. 
1947 Directive, supra note 170 (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 146) (photo copy on file with author, 001). 
 190. 1947 Manual, supra note 170, at app. V, at 3 (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 185–89) (photo copy on file with author, 086). 
 191. Id. 
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ble for services.192 After the publication of the 1947 Manual, the 
IRO Director General called for further investigation based on 
questions regarding the treatment of former members of the 
Baltic Waffen SS units by the former Latvian Minister.193 A Se-
cret Memo was prepared that reviewed the results of an inquiry 
into records of the U.S. Army on the unit, and findings from the 
International Military Tribunal at the Nuremberg Trials.194 The 
Memo assessed eligibility under the persecutor bar and the bar 
for assisting enemy operations.195 It cited the findings of the In-
ternational Military Tribunal that the units were involved in 
“the persecution and extermination of the Jews, brutalities and 
killings in concentration camps, excesses in the administration 
of occupied territories, the administration of the slave labour 
programmes and the mis-treatment and murder of prisoners of 
war.”196 The Tribunal determined that members of the SS units 
“with knowledge that it was being used for the commission of 
acts declared criminal by [the International Military Tribunal 
Charter], or who were personally implicated as members of the 
organisation in the commission of such crimes” were part of a 
criminal group.197 The inquiry also revealed that Estonian and 
Latvian members of the Baltic Waffen SS units had been given 
a choice of serving in the Waffen SS division or in the forced la-
bor units (Arbeitsadienst).198 The committee decided to employ 
the “burden of proof” employed by the U.S. Military Govern-
ment Courts in the Denazification trials and accepted by the 
U.N. Chief Prosecutor in Nuremberg that created a rebuttable 
presumption based on membership.199 As a consequence of this 
choice, members of the SS units were changed to prima facie 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Exec. Comm., Memorandum of the Director-
General on Policy Regarding Baltic Refugees, EC/OD/1 (Mar. 21, 1949) [here-
inafter IRO Exec. Comm. Memo] (on file with the National Archive of France, 
AJ # 43 131) (photo copy on file with author, 064–80). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo 
copy on file with author, 073–77). 
 197. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo 
copy on file with author, 073). 
 198. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo 
copy on file with author, 067–75); 1949 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with 
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy on file with author, 
120–21). 
 199. IRO Exec. Comm. Memo, supra note 193 (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 131 074) (photo copy on file with author, 43). 
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ineligible as voluntarily assisting the enemy in their opera-
tions.200 
The final 1950 Manual includes additional details as to the 
formation of the Baltic Waffen S.S. units from para-military 
groups (Schutzmannschaften) that were comprised mostly of 
volunteers and charged with police and guard duties.201 The 
Manual states that members of the Schutzmannschaften are 
prima facie ineligible but “this presumption may be rebutted if 
the applicant can produce evidence that he was conscripted and 
if it is made plausible that he did not commit atrocities or oth-
erwise persecute civilian populations.”202 Similarly, the 13 
SS/Handzar Division, active in Yugoslavia during the war, was 
described as a “division [that] indulged in excesses equal to 
those of any troops in the Balkans,” and its members were pri-
ma facie ineligible as a result (archival research reveals two 
examples in which prima facie ineligibility was successfully re-
butted by members of this group).203 
Additional guidance can be found in the IRO’s appellate 
review of eligibility determinations themselves. Between its in-
ception in early 1948 and the conclusion of its operations at the 
end in 1952, the Review Board issued over thirty-five thousand 
decisions.204 One thousand four hundred and twenty-five of the-
se decisions are preserved in the French National Archive.205 
 
 200. Id. (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo 
copy on file with author, 078); 1949 Manual, supra note 170 (on file with the 
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 148) (photo copy on file with author, 123). 
 201. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 54–55. 
 202. Id. at 57. 
 203. Id. at 84; Veladic, 6452, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Re-
view Board, Geneva 15763 WA-212/K K.0005 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file with the 
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 011); 
Vejo, 6450, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 
WA-219/K K.0002 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 025). 
 204. HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 565 (explaining that active operations for 
the entire IRO ended on January 31, 1952); see also Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], 
Summary Record of the 95th Meeting of the General Council, GC/SR/95 (Mar. 
4, 1952) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 117–24) (photo 
copy on file with author, (General Council Records) 312, 314) (discussing the 
end of the Review Board on February 15, 1952). 
 205. The vast majority of these decisions were destroyed so as to avoid dis-
closure of confidential information and the use of the decisions by countries 
wishing to punish political dissidents. Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Summary Rec-
ord of the 101st Meeting of the General Council, at 15–16, GC/SR/101 (Mar. 7, 
1952) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 117–24) (photo 
copy on file with author, (General Council Records) 302–04) (discussing trans-
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These decisions demonstrate several principles in the applica-
tion of the persecutor bar. 
First and most importantly, the bar was not applied to vic-
tims of the Nazi regime. The 1950 Eligibility Manual describes 
the operations of the concentration camps, notes the use of in-
mates to enforce discipline, and states that these inmates were 
at times responsible for more brutality than the SS guards.206 
However, the Manual does not then indicate that victims of the 
Nazi regime who were forced to take on enforcement and opera-
tional roles within the camps were ineligible, as the Manual in-
dicates for Nazi groups implicated in atrocities.207 Of the sixty-
five decisions preserved in the Archive that examine cases of 
individuals who claimed they were victims of the Nazi or fascist 
regimes, none were excluded for assisting the enemy in perse-
cuting others.208 There is one decision from a political prisoner 
 
fer of all Review Board decisions to the office of the U.N. High Commissioner 
on Refugees and the Commissioner’s commitment to destroy all decisions that 
were no longer needed). 
 206. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 101–02; see also Fedorenko v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 490, 534–36 & nn. 4–9 (1981) (J. Stevens, dissenting). 
 207. Compare 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 102, with id. at 89 (Ustashi; 
SS Handzar Division), and id. at 81 (Zveno), and id. at 78 (Iron Guard), and 
id. at 74 (members of Berczenyi League who participated in the murder of 
Jews in Ruthenia). 
 208. Heckers, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Ge-
neva 020.4220 (Apr. 3, 1951) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 477) (photo copy on file with author, 005–06); Renelt, HA-310, Int’l Refu-
gee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 20043 HA-246/EK.911 
(May 31, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (pho-
to copy on file with author, 051–52); Molz, N 20932, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], 
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva NA - 1129 HT/N/499-545 (May 19, 1950) 
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file 
with author, 075); Hassan, 75.994/2, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva L/A 349 (May 15, 1950) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with author, 004–06); 
Bottenwinser, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 
L/A 175 (May 2, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
486) (photo copy on file with author, 019–20); [name illegible], Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board (May 1950) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 046–47); 
Heisner, 1,103.615, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva HT/W/213 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, 
AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 131); Heyman, 604486, Int’l Ref-
ugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA – 238/P 227 (Apr. 
4, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy 
on file with author, 141); Jolitz, 603883, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of 
the Review Board, Geneva BA – 261/P 237 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the Na-
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tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 095); 
Rosenkranz, 1,013.116, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva HT/W/111 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, 
AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 129); Rosenkranz, 1,014.783, Int’l 
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HT/W/111 (Apr. 4, 
1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on 
file with author, 128); Hasse, 609329, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva BA – 255/P 236 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 096); 
Heilmark, 610073, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva BA – 256/P 242. (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 111); Hilprecht, 610619, 
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA – 256/P 
241 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) 
(photo copy on file with author, 143); Joseph, 609311, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], 
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HA – 221/P 207 (Apr. 4, 1950) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 099); Groeger, 1,010.293, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva 13.864 HT/W/194 (Apr. 3, 1950) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 133); Riewe, 
610395, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA – 
242/P 142 (Apr. 3, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
141) (photo copy on file with author, 074); Rosenberg, 1,013.312, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HT/W/123 (Apr. 2, 1950) (on 
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with 
author, 124); Ctvrtecka, 1,013.318, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva HT/W/125 (Apr. 1, 1950) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 123); Pollak, 
1,014.560, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 
HT/W/152 (Apr. 1, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
485) (photo copy on file with author, 119); Hamburger, 1,013.215, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HT/W/113 (Mar. 31, 1950) 
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file 
with author, 118); Schulze, 609265, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva B – 223/P 201 (Mar. 31, 1950) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 068); 
Steinhauer, 1,013.432, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva HT/W/124 (Mar. 31, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 167); Weigler, 1,014.333, 
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva HT/W/187 
(Mar. 31, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) 
(photo copy on file with author, 180); Ring, 604734, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], 
Decision of the Review Board, Geneva NA – 204/F 185 (Mar. 29, 1950) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 080); Fraenkel, 1,013.690, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Re-
view Board, Geneva HT/W/171 (Mar. 21, 1950) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 132); Moskowitz, 
1,012.887, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 
HT/W/23 (Mar. 20, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
485) (photo copy on file with author, 126); Soncinas, 487, Int’l Refugee Org. 
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 10412 Aug A-498/v87 (Jan. 9, 
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1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on 
file with author, 119); Reznik, MI-197, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva MA-174/V.131 (Dec. 5, 1949) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 061); Lusbig, 
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board (Nov. 24, 1949) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 005–06); Schabowski, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board (Nov. 24, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
181) (photo copy on file with author, 011); Engel, 1,048.270, Int’l Refugee Org. 
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva LP/13 (Nov. 23, 1949) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 039); Molnar, 1,047.999, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva LP/3 (Nov. 23, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 024); Oettinger, 
604878, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA-
93/K K.0204/B (Nov. 4, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 004); Sternberg, 604937, Int’l Refu-
gee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva K.0205/B BA-726/K 
(Nov. 3, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo 
copy on file with author, 135); Heinich, 605808, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Deci-
sion of the Review Board, Geneva BA-145 K.0211/B (Nov. 1, 1949) (on file with 
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 
112); Junack, 604102, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva BA – 79K K.0192/B (Oct. 26, 1949) (on file with the National Archive 
of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 102); Kueri, 1,010.079, 
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva B.V. 170 (Oct. 
19, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo 
copy on file with author, 049); Adler-Alfoeldi, 88 365/3, Int’l Refugee Org. 
[IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva K 128 (Aug. 30, 1949) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 004); Hoffmann, MI-233, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva MA – 213/P (Aug. 30, 1949) (on file with the National Archive 
of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 160); Hansmeyer, 
604353, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA – 
73/P (Aug. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) 
(photo copy on file with author, 082); Heitmann, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], De-
cision of the Review Board, Geneva BA – 169/P (Aug. 11, 1949) (on file with 
the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 
115); Henke, 604472, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva BA – 74/P (Aug. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, 
AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 120); Henning, 604877, Int’l Ref-
ugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva BA – 76/P (Aug. 11, 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on 
file with author, 122); Moreas, 2555, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board (Aug. 8, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 076); Fain, 1.009.353, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 12207 PV/9B (July 21, 1949) 
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file 
with author, 077); Zel-nak, 1820 1/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva 8023 (July 7, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 059); Luks-Weinreb, Int’l 
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in a concentration camp that mentions he was a clerk, and not 
a kapo, but this is the only decision among the Jewish and non-
Jewish victims that discusses an inmate’s role in the camp, and 
the function of the note is not clear.209 In contrast, non-victims 
 
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 3277 (May 31, 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on 
file with author, 034); Strauber, 1.037.784, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision 
of the Review Board, Geneva 3199 (May 23, 1949) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 035); 
Rumschisky, 1.032.216, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva 3100 (May 10, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 036); Stieber, Int’l Refu-
gee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 7443 LI.583 (Apr. 30, 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on 
file with author, 065); Zeilinger, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Re-
view Board, Geneva 7360 LI.601 (Apr. 30, 1949) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 074); Gaon, Int’l 
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 2734 (Apr. 30, 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on 
file with author, 013); Schultz, 13570, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva NA-391/P (Apr. 4, 1949) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 065–66); 
Boetticher de Klein, 495, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva T 1644 495 (Feb. 4, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 003); Mentzen-Theuna, 
147.143, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 4807 
T – 1299 (Jan. 21, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
180) (photo copy on file with author, 029–30); Heilbrunn, 1334, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 62.3 (Dec. 9, 1948) (on file 
with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with au-
thor, 035–36); Hohenstein, 1589, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Re-
view Board, Geneva 6210 1589/P (Dec. 9, 1948) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 033–34); 
Koransky, 1335, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Gene-
va 6208 1335/P (Dec. 9, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 031–32); Lengert, 100.799, Int’l Ref-
ugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva T 1448 (Nov. 31, 1948) 
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # AJ 43 180) (photo copy on 
file with author, 027–28); Djukic, 88.266, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of 
the Review Board, Geneva K.729 (Nov. 4, 1948) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 143) (photo copy on file with author, 045–46); 
Schwarz, 10176, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Gene-
va NA – 106/k (Oct. 21, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 072); Morstadt, 167.499, Int’l Refu-
gee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva T.1208 (Sept. 8, 1948) 
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file 
with author, 040); Joskovicz, 5871, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva NA-222 (Aug. 18, 1948) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 100). 
 209. Schultz, 13570, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
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who were part of units under Nazi control were systematically 
screened for disqualification under the persecutor bar even 
once they were able to show they were otherwise eligible for 
IRO services.210 
Second, the persecutor bar was in fact seldom invoked. Of 
the 1425 decisions preserved in the archive, only seventy-five 
discuss the persecutor bar at all, and only twenty decisions ex-
clude applicants on this basis alone, while ten reverse the ap-
plication of the bar.211 The remaining forty-five decisions apply 
the persecutor bar in conjunction with another exclusion. A re-
view of these seventy-five decisions illustrates additional re-
quirements for the bar. 
The decisions show that voluntarily joining a group active 
in the commission of atrocities against civilian populations was 
sufficient for exclusion from benefits absent exonerating evi-
dence.212 For example, Yugoslavs who chose to join the Ustas 
were excluded based on the harms inflicted by those forces.213 A 
 
Board, Geneva NA-391/P (Apr. 4, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 065–66). 
 210. Stauga, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Gene-
va 11251 B.B.2835 (June 22, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 031–32) (Latvian Legion); 
Putnieks, 298633, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Ge-
neva 9227 BB.2833 (June 22, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 042) (Latvian Legion); 
Banfai, 999.048/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Ge-
neva LA. 626 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 017) (Hungarian Police); Jakab, 
997.012/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva LA. 
651 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) 
(photo copy on file with author, 057) (Hungarian Gendarmerie); Bertok, 
996.401/1, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva LA. 
628 (Mar. 11, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142) 
(photo copy on file with author, 021) (Hungarian Gendarmerie). 
 211. See supra note 188 (citing all cases involving the persecutor bar and 
describing the basis for each IRO decision). [Editors’ note: Minnesota Law Re-
view could not independently verify the numbers in this paragraph.] 
 212. Some decisions applied the voluntariness requirement to both the bar 
for assisting enemy operations and for assisting the enemy in persecution by 
noting the voluntary nature of the individual’s participation in a persecutory 
group. See, e.g., Pusic, 3313, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva DS/132 (May 10, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 020–21). 
 213. Bajraktarevic, 1.000.084, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Re-
view Board, Geneva KK/30 (Jan. 27, 1950) (on file with the National Archive 
of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with author, 005); Franic, Int’l Ref-
ugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva B.I. 104 (Dec. 8, 1948) 
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Latvian volunteer in the German Gestapo and the Latvian SS 
Division was barred based on a denunciation for his involve-
ment in the executions and deportations that took place in the 
Warsaw Ghetto.214 Accountability for the voluntary choice to 
join a unit known for its brutality also applied even if the peti-
tioner was conscripted into service, but had an option to join a 
general army unit, instead of one implicated in the persecution 
of Jews and other civilian groups.215 
The same was true for individuals who voluntarily joined 
anti-Semitic groups known for their support of brutal tactics in 
occupied territories because they shared these beliefs. For ex-
ample, a member of the Arrow Cross Party216 was excluded in a 
decision that described the applicant as convinced of the 
“rightness of its cause” and that the party was the “salvation of 
 
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 478) (photo copy on file 
with author, 065–66); Mixrut, 98.327, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, 9925 TK-171 (Mar. 29, 1949) (on file with the National Archive 
of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 016); see 1950 Manual, 
supra note 170, at 83 (explaining that “all Ustas units had a bad record of ex-
cesses and atrocities” and that the Krizari were one of several Ustas groups); 
see also Fuchs, 1.013.173, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva HT/W/115 (Mar. 30, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 121) (voluntarily joined 
SS division in Poland); Abdourahaman, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of 
the Review Board, Geneva 3538 (Feb. 13, 1950) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 052) (volunteered 
in Tartar police which was involved in punitive actions against civilians). 
 214. Skaitslauks, 692800/8800, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva WA-1073/EK.848 (June 12, 1950) (on file with the Na-
tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with author, 039). 
 215. See, e.g., Tratsch, 942236, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva MA – 496, EK523 (Apr. 5, 1950) (on file with the Na-
tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with author, 010) 
(stating the petitioner “was taken in a police raid,” but still excluding him be-
cause he “voluntarily joined the German Wehrmacht”); Urm, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board (Nov. 9, 1949) (on file with the Na-
tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 004) 
(stating that the choice of the petitioner to join the “notorious” Schutzpolizei 
instead of the German Wehrmacht units renders him ineligible under the per-
secutor bar and the bar for voluntary assistance); Kalaba, 6422, Int’l Refugee 
Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva WA – 22/K K.0003 (Sept. 29, 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on 
file with author, 019) (stating service in the SS in Bosnia justified exclusion 
under the persecutor bar). 
 216. A violently anti-Semitic and totalitarian group. 1950 Manual, supra 
note 170, at 72. 
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Hungary.”217 A Lithuanian member of the Nazi party as of 1939 
was similarly barred for his long-standing belief in Nazi poli-
cies.218 
The exclusion was also used to capture individuals who 
had engaged in direct acts of economic persecution against 
primarily Jewish populations and were thus not subject to the 
exclusion for assisting enemy forces in their operations against 
the United Nations. Holding a high office in a governmental 
unit that implemented a persecutory policy or taking affirma-
tive action to benefit from that policy resulted in exclusion. A 
liaison officer between the Hungarian Ministry of Finance and 
the Office of the High Commissioner for the Abandoned Jewish 
Property was excluded for failure to rebut the presumption that 
he participated in persecution through expropriation of proper-
ty as an officer of the High Commission.219 But taking personal 
advantage of expropriation, regardless of position, could also 
lead to exclusion. A member of the Hlinka Guard220 was exclud-
ed for his assumption of ownership over a farm whose Jewish 
owners were dispossessed as part of a policy of “aryanizat-
ion.”221 
 
 217. Vamos, MI-481, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva MA-409/EK.370 (Mar. 24, 1950) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 484) (photo copy on file with author, 013). 
 218. Klawieter, 97.631, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva 9986 (Sept. 16, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 483) (photo copy on file with author, 046); see also Zern, Int’l 
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva (May 19, 1950) (on 
file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with 
author, 042) (noting the petitioner created a German circle for Nazi party 
members in Poland). 
 219. Czorba, 774706, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva HT/N/549 (May 20, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 034). 
 220. A group considered by the Eligibility Board to be fascist and a coun-
terpart to the German SS. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 62. 
 221. Marincak, 84.444, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva K 559 (Oct. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 010); see also 
Tiesenhausen, 2962, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva 12387 KC/2962 (July 15, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author, 009) (excluding Nazi par-
ty member that administered expropriation of property from Polish farmers); 
Krajnc, 88.809, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Gene-
va K.1145 (Apr. 13, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
142) (photo copy on file with author, 075) (excluding petitioner for receiving 
property from displaced Poles and employment as a German interpreter; the 
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Direct and personal action was required where the nature 
of the group did not create a presumption of persecutory con-
duct. The Review Board reversed the application of the perse-
cutor bar to a member of the Czechoslovak Gendarmerie in the 
absence of evidence “as to his personal activities.”222 Another 
was reversed for lack of evidence that the applicant “took part 
in the persecution of civil population[s]” notwithstanding the 
notorious reputation of the SS division to which he was at-
tached.223 A voluntary member of the Hungarian Gendarmerie, 
which was responsible for the escort of Jewish transports, was 
excluded for voluntary assistance to the enemy in their opera-
tions against the United Nations, but not for assisting the en-
emy in persecution.224 The Review Board reversed an ineligibil-
ity determination under the persecutor bar for a Lithuanian 
applicant who served in a German unit, after he was able to 
prove on a second appeal that he used his service to further 
Lithuanian resistance movements.225 A Latvian chief of police, 
on the other hand, was barred because the Review Board had 
evidence of his personal responsibility for the execution of Jews 
and gypsies in his district.226 
High level officers in forces under German command were 
deemed personally responsible for the violent policies they exe-
cuted even if not all units participated in those policies. Lower-
level officers within those same forces, however, were not ex-
cluded without evidence of personal involvement in persecu-
tion. For example, a petitioner who held a high position within 
the Hungarian Gendarmerie while under German High Com-
mand and was responsible for carrying out German policy was 
 
Board also notes that his son, born in 1940, was named Adolf). 
 222. Stranak, 771089, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva WA – 464/K.0033 (Mar. 10, 1949) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 021). 
 223. Vejo, 6450, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva WA – 219/K K.0002 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file with the National Archive 
of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on file with author, 025); accord Veladic, 
6452, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 15763 
WA – 212/K K.0005 (Sept. 29, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 482) (photo copy on file with author, 011). 
 224. 1950 Manual, supra note 170, at 33(I) ex. 4. 
 225. Ausiura, 83.736, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva K.647 (Nov. 3, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 142) (photo copy on file with author, 013–14). 
 226. Eichelis, N 22473, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva NA – 1082 HT/N/346 (May 8, 1950) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 025). 
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excluded227 while a low-ranking member of the Hungarian Gen-
darmerie was not.228 However, this principle was not without 
qualification where the underlying presumptions were shown 
to be inapplicable in a given case. For example, a Hungarian 
soldier who had been promoted within his unit was not exclud-
ed due to his rank because he explained that the promotions 
were due to his pre-war service and not tied to his performance 
as a commander of enemy forces.229 
Investigators230 and interpreters231 were excluded regard-
less of conscription due to their positions of trust and their sig-
 
 227. Szylasy, WA-31/K, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva 1796 (Nov. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 161); see Bliumfeldas, 
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva DS/161 (May 
22, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 485) (photo 
copy on file with author, 010–11) (excluding the petitioner under persecutor 
bar). Similar to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Fedorenko, the Review Board 
noted the commendation the applicant received from German authorities for 
his service in the Lithuanian criminal police and the German Security Police 
as evidence of his “voluntary” assistance in persecuting civilian populations. 
Id.; see also Beregfy, N 23191, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva 22223 NA – 1079 HT/N/426 (May 20, 1950) (on file with the 
National Archive of France, AJ # 43 477) (photo copy on file with author, 009) 
(excluding the wife of the Minister of War of the Szalasi regime, who had been 
executed after the war, for benefiting from her husband’s activity); Major, 529, 
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 15960 (Jan. 
24, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 476) (photo 
copy on file with author, 007–08) (excluding applicant who held one of the 
highest military positions in the Szalasi regime, who was responsible for col-
lecting 500,000 nationals for service in the German Wehrmacht even though 
he said his aim was to keep those conscripts from serving on the front lines by 
constantly delaying their deployment). Ferenc Szalasi led the Arrow Cross—a 
pro-Nazi party—and became head of state in 1944. RAPHAEL PATAI, THE JEWS 
OF HUNGARY: HISTORY, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY 584 (1996). Under his rule, 
the Arrow Cross, together with the German Reich, were responsible for the 
murder of ten to fifteen thousand Jews. Id. at 590. He was hanged in Hungary 
for crimes against the state. Id. at 589. 
 228. Rada, 88.042, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva 5557 (Aug. 3, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 142–43) (photo copy on file with author, 056). 
 229. Id. (reversing application of the persecutor bar). 
 230. Barbath, 998.479, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva LP/12 (Nov. 23, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 143) (photo copy on file with author, 019) (finding a husband 
ineligible because he was responsible for arrests of many Communists in Hun-
gary, and his wife’s ineligibility followed from her husband’s); Mesnikoff, Int’l 
Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 3079 (Jan. 11, 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 181) (photo copy on 
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nificant level of involvement in causing the atrocities perpetu-
ated by their superiors. As the Review Board explained in one 
case, the petitioner abandoned his pre-war occupation and used 
his knowledge of Russian “for preferment in a unit notorious for 
its excesses.”232 Informants were barred because their action led 
directly to persecution by the Germans. A member of a pro-
Nazi group in Czechoslovakia was excluded based on the 
group’s philosophy and the fact he was “personally implicated” 
in denouncing resisters to the Germans.233 Another petitioner 
unassociated with a particular group was barred for denounc-
ing his neighbor to the Germans (and the neighbor was subse-
quently arrested).234 
Participation as a concentration camp guard was generally 
sufficient to trigger the persecutor bar absent other evidence,235 
 
file with author, 066). 
 231. Artinow, 1919, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, 
Geneva DS/62 (May 12, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ 
# 43 485) (photo copy on file with author, 026–27) (discussing the “position of 
trust” he had as an interpreter for the Germans and that his role meant he 
“associated himself with them . . . and against the civilian populations”); Han-
dler, 1,004.075, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Gene-
va KK/9 (Jan. 25, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 
484) (photo copy on file with author, 006) (noting that petitioner who claimed 
only that he was employed as an interpreter was also a corporal in the securi-
ty police in Austria); Orlowsky, 11365, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva NA-211/K (Feb. 9, 1949) (on file with the National Ar-
chive of France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 024). 
 232. Kappaurs, 2377, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva 12363 (July 8, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author, 002). 
 233. Janota, 815784, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva WA – 435/K (Oct. 8, 1949) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 141) (photo copy on file with author, 060). 
 234. Weber, 1,040.101/4, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, Geneva L/A 227 (May 8, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with author, 018); see also Pauer, 
84.477, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva K 558 
(Oct. 19, 1948) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 142–43) 
(photo copy on file with author, 045) (“[I]t is established that the role of the 
Gestapo in Czechoslovakia was in persecuting the civil population and conse-
quently any ‘informant’ or ‘witness’ for them is excluded under [the persecutor 
bar].”). 
 235. E.g., [name illegible], 2051, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Geneva 9273 NA-290/P (July 27, 1949) (on file with the Na-
tional Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author, 005) 
(stating that service in the perimeter guard of a work camp under the direc-
tion of the Waffen SS assisted in the persecution of civilians); Jurkus, 1419, 
Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review Board, Geneva 6007 (July 2, 
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but even camp commanders could rebut a presumption of ex-
clusion with evidence that established their own lack of per-
sonal participation in atrocities. The Review Board determined 
in one case that the petitioner’s plea that he was conscripted 
into the Waffen SS was not credible and also stated that the 
persecutor bar would still apply to involuntary service.236 But 
the next month, the Review Board considered the appeal of an 
applicant who joined the gendarmerie and became the com-
mander of a collection camp housing 4000 Jews, in light of his 
promise to provide a statement from Jews in that camp that he 
did not personally participate in their persecution.237 This was 
determined despite the fact that the camp inmates had been 
taken by other officers and killed when confronted by Allied 
forces because the applicant alleged the executions were per-
formed without his knowledge or involvement. The applicant 
eventually failed to produce the promised statement exonerat-
ing him from personal involvement and the Review Board con-
cluded that “[i]n view of petitioner’s failure to submit the proof 
he promised, and since it is essential for a favourable determi-
nation of the appeal” he was barred for assisting the enemy in 
persecution and in their operations against the United Na-
tions.238 Notably, this evidence provides a somewhat different 
account of IRO eligibility than provided by Foreign Service Of-
ficer Jenkins in his testimony in Fedorenko.239 Officer Jenkins 
testified that SS members who joined involuntarily were not 
excluded from the IRO and compared this group to the concen-
tration camp guards who were categorically excluded, stating 
that the difference was due to the acts for which those groups 
were responsible.240 In reality, however, the same presumptions 
 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on 
file with author, 057); Niemann, 4522, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the 
Review Board, Wurzburg WA-117/p (Nov. 2, 1948) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 479) (photo copy on file with author, 012) (exclud-
ing petitioner because he was “entrusted with guard and police functions in 
German occupied territory”); see, e.g., Black, supra note 37, at 40–43 (describ-
ing required actions taken by camp guards). 
 236. Timofajew, 1.043.414/3, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Re-
view Board, Geneva L/A 261 (May 8, 1950) (on file with the National Archive 
of France, AJ # 43 486) (photo copy on file with author, 016). 
 237. Porpaczy, 995.459, Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Decision of the Review 
Board, 8716 K.1174 (June 28, 1950) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ # 43 180) (photo copy on file with author, 041–42). 
 238. Id. 
 239. See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text. 
 240. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 510 n.32 (1981). 
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applied to both groups. SS members and camp guards were 
prima facie ineligible because members of both generally could 
have chosen to join units who were engaged in normal warfare, 
not persecutory campaigns, but would have experienced worse 
conditions by joining those units. SS members and concentra-
tion camp guards alike were held accountable for the activities 
of those units absent evidence of individual innocence in the 
acts performed. 
The common thread through the policy directives and indi-
vidual decisions is the Review Board’s search for indicia of per-
sonal culpability. Culpability could take the form of a choice to 
join a more brutal unit, merit promotion to a position of respon-
sibility to implement Nazi policy, seeking personal gain from 
the economic persecution of Jews and other Nazi targets, or 
taking direct action to facilitate the immediate persecution 
perpetuated by the Nazis or their counterparts. Moreover, an 
affiliation with a persecutory unit gave rise only to a presump-
tion of ineligibility—one that could be rebutted with evidence of 
personal innocence even in the context of the atrocities of World 
War II. Most importantly, victims were not barred. Rather, the 
victims of persecution were considered apart from their perse-
cutors and were not screened for actions they were forced to 
take while simply trying to survive. 
These materials demonstrate that the persecutor bar, as 
conceived at the time it was first incorporated into U.S. law, 
did not, as the Fedorenko Court asserted, exclude all those who 
assisted in the persecution of civilians. Nor did it exclude from 
benefits, as the Negusie Court described, those who engaged in 
“nonculpable, involuntary assistance.”241 And, it was not ap-
plied, as the BIA concluded, based only on the “objective ef-
fects”242 of an individual’s actions. The bar was not categorical: 
evidence of individual innocence in the actions of the group was 
a defense and victims were not considered persecutors. Conse-
quently, the bar applied only to individuals who took specific 
and direct action to cause the persecution of others or to benefit 
from it. In other words, the bar assigned blame. 
 
 241. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 520 (2009). 
 242. In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 465 (B.I.A. 1983), rev’d, 
Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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III.  TRACING THE ORIGIN OF THE PERSECUTOR BAR IN 
U.S. LAW   
Having recovered the confines of the persecutor bar as it 
was originally applied, this Article discusses next the “weight 
and relevance” of this history as displayed in the statements of 
congressional intent that accompanied the bar’s enactment 
throughout U.S. immigration law. 
The Court in Negusie directed the BIA to focus on the 
meaning of the persecutor bar in the Refugee Act. The legisla-
tive history of the Refugee Act, however, shows that when Con-
gress created that bar, it drew on other persecution-related 
bars contained in prior immigration laws. This Part follows the 
persecutor bar’s common statutory language and legislative 
history from its origin in the Constitution of the IRO through 
its appearance in the Refugee Act to its most recent replication 
in a form of relief from deportation. Indeed, in addition to dis-
qualifying an immigrant from protection under the Refugee 
Act, Congress has barred individuals who have “ordered, incit-
ed, assisted, or otherwise participated in . . . persecution” from 
cancellation of removal, lawful permanent resident status, and 
naturalization, creating separate grounds of inadmissibility 
and deportability based on that conduct.243 Part III also identi-
fies the additional sources Congress invoked as informing its 
understanding of the persecutor bar. In light of this history, I 
assert that the bar should be interpreted consistently across 
immigration law and should give substantial “weight and rele-
vance” to the bar’s meaning at the time it was first adopted in 
U.S. law. 
A. THE DISPLACED PERSONS ACT OF 1948 AND THE REFUGEE 
RELIEF ACT OF 1953 INCORPORATE THE PERSECUTOR BAR FROM 
THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION 
The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 contains the first ap-
pearance of a persecutor bar in U.S. law. It did so by referenc-
ing and incorporating the definitions and exclusions of the IRO 
Constitution. Congress enacted the DPA in June 1948 to allow 
for the admission of 220,000 refugees and displaced persons liv-
ing in European IRO camps without regard to the quota system 
that was in place in U.S. immigration law at the time.244 
 
 243. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(E) (2012). 
 244. H.R. REP. NO. 80-2410 (1948) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1948 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2053, 2053. The DPA of 1948 was heavily criticized for its anti-
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In drafting the DPA, Congress incorporated the IRO’s def-
initions and eligibility criteria by reference and then added its 
own limitations.245 The Act also created the Displaced Persons 
Commission,246 tasked with administering the Act and investi-
gating visa applicants to assess their “character, history, and 
eligibility.”247 The DPA defined a “[d]isplaced person” as anyone 
who met the definition of “refugee” or “displaced person” and 
 
Semitic intent and effects. See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, AMERICA AND THE 
SURVIVORS OF THE HOLOCAUST 137–82 (1982) (including several chapters con-
cerning congressional actions surrounding the DPA); ROBERT A. DIVINE, 
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY, 1924-1952, at 120 (1957); HAIM GENIZI, 
AMERICA’S FAIR SHARE: THE ADMISSION AND RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED 
PERSONS, 1945-1952, at 66–111 (1993) (discussing, in a manner similar to 
Dinnerstein, congressional actions surrounding the DPA); LOESCHER & 
SCANLAN, supra note 128, at 21. The Act limited eligibility to those displaced 
persons who were in Germany, Austria, or Italy before December 22, 1945, 
which excluded “more than 100,000 Jews who were released from Russia in 
the spring of 1946 and/or who fled the Polish pogroms that summer.” 
DINNERSTEIN, supra, at 166. It also prioritized agricultural workers, a profes-
sion with few Jewish members, and designated forty percent of the visas for 
displaced persons from Baltic countries, many of whom had been active in Na-
zi forces. LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 128, at 20. The Act further al-
lowed for the emigration of ethnic Germans who had been living outside Ger-
many and Austria at the time of the war and were returned to those countries 
after the war’s conclusion. This population was excluded from the IRO and 
was accused of containing Nazi collaborators, but was eligible for emigration 
under the DPA. GENIZI, supra, at 81, 90. The legislative history reflected the 
express purpose of the Act’s proponents to limit Jewish emigration. 
DINNERSTEIN, supra, at 137–38, 145, 164, 175. President Truman called the 
Act “flagrantly discriminatory” but signed it anyway. Id. at 175; DIVINE, su-
pra, at 128. 
 245. The Act was only passed after years of debate though and contained 
limitations on the timing and location of European displacements designed to 
prevent the immigration of Jewish victims of persecution. See Anker & Posner, 
The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 9, 12–13 (1981); see also Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Summary 
Record of 24th Meeting of the Executive Committee, at 3–4, EC/SR/24 (Mar. 28, 
1949) (on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo copy on 
file with author, 041–42) (providing a statement by the European Director of 
the Displaced Persons Commission acknowledging the inequities contained in 
the 1948 law and the hope that those inequities would be amended through 
proposals being debated at the time). The Act also set out priorities for visas, 
preferring (1) agricultural workers; (2) household, construction, clothing, and 
garment workers or displaced persons “possessing special educational, scien-
tific, technological or professional qualifications”; or (3) blood relatives of Unit-
ed States citizens or lawful permanent residents. Displaced Persons Act of 
1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 6, 62 Stat. 1009, 1012 (1948). 
 246. Displaced Persons Act § 8. 
 247. Id. § 10.  
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was “the concern of the International Refugee Organization” as 
set out in the IRO Constitution.248 Because the IRO Constitu-
tion excludes anyone who “assisted the enemy in persecuting 
civil populations” of U.N. member countries, Congress incorpo-
rated the persecutor bar directly into U.S. law by adopting the 
IRO’s eligibility provisions.249 The DPA was amended in 1950 to 
increase the number of visas that could be granted, to extend 
the Act’s duration until 1952, to include some persons of Ger-
man ethnic origin who had been excluded by the IRO Constitu-
tion, and to formally include consular officers and INS officials 
in the visa approval process.250 The exclusions contained in 2(a) 
and 2(b) of the IRO Constitution were retained through the 
continued reference to the IRO definitions in Annex I of the 
Constitution, but the 1950 amendment also included the perse-
cutor bar explicitly in the statute’s text.251 The DPA as amended 
specifically provided that no visa could be granted “to any per-
son who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person 
because of race, religion, or national origin, or to any person 
who has voluntarily borne arms against the United States dur-
ing World War II.”252 
The legislative history of the 1948 DPA is silent with re-
spect to the persecutor bar. Contemporary records show that 
the application of the persecutor bar under the DPA was actu-
ally largely determined by IRO officials. The congressional de-
bate centered on the restrictions to limit those IRO beneficiar-
ies who could obtain visas to the United States.253 In 1950, a 
congressional member remarked that the amended Act would 
 
 248. Id. § 2(b).  
 249. IRO CONST. annex I, pt. II, ¶ (2)(a), reprinted in U.N., supra note 126, 
at 20. 
 250. See Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (1950). These changes largely al-
leviated the anti-Semitic restrictions contained in the earlier version by elimi-
nating the 1945 cut-off date, the preference for agricultural workers, and the 
quota for Baltic applicants. DINNERSTEIN, supra note 244, at 247–48; 
LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 128, at 22. In the end, over 360,000 indi-
viduals were admitted to the United States under the DPA including 100,000 
Jews. Id. at 251; accord GENIZI, supra note 244, at 111; see also DIVINE, supra 
note 244, at 144 n.40 (stating that the grand total was 378,623). 
 251. § 11, 64 Stat. at 227. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Massey, supra note 16, at 114–15; see 95 CONG. REC. 7169–202 (1949); 
94 CONG. REC. 7727–34 (1948); 94 CONG. REC. 7770–78 (1948); see also S. REP. 
NO. 81-1237 (1950), as reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2513, 2514 (discussing 
imprecision of the IRO displaced person definition). 
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now bar past persecutors,254 seemingly unaware that the DPA 
already contained this bar through its adoption of the IRO eli-
gibility criteria.255 The primacy of the IRO adjudications in the 
functioning of the DPA is confirmed by both IRO documents 
and statements by U.S. officials. A flow chart issued by the 
IRO shows that only applicants deemed eligible for IRO ser-
vices were forwarded to U.S. officials for additional inspec-
tion.256 A member of the foreign service testifying before Con-
gress on the visa review process by the Displaced Persons 
Commission explained that the delay in file transfer and the 
pure volume of applications meant that reviewing officers re-
lied almost exclusively on the IRO file containing its eligibility 
determination.257 Additionally, the European Coordinator of the 
Displaced Persons Commission addressed the Executive Com-
mittee of the IRO and thanked the organization for rapidly pro-
cessing displaced persons, without which implementation of the 
DPA would not have been possible.258 The scope of the bar in 
the DPA was thus effectively set by its administrators in the 
IRO. 
The DPA expired in 1952 and the Refugee Relief Act (RRA) 
of 1953 took its place.259 Congress passed the RRA to authorize 
the grant of visas to refugees outside of the country-based quo-
 
 254. 95 CONG. REC. 7184. 
 255. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, § 2(b), 62 Stat. 
1009, 1009 (1948). 
 256. Exec. Sec’y of the Preparatory Comm’n, supra note 54, at 33–35. 
 257. Alleged Nazi War Criminals: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immi-
gration, Citizenship, & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 
106–07 (1978) (explaining that the Displaced Persons Commission relied on 
the file and eligibility determination made by the IRO). 
 258. Int’l Refugee Org. [IRO], Summary Record of 24th Meeting of the Ex-
ecutive Committee, at 3–4, EC/SR/24 (Mar. 28, 1949) (on file with the National 
Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo copy on file with author, 041–42); Int’l 
Refugee Org. [IRO], Summary Record of 80th Meeting of the Executive Com-
mittee, at 4, EC/SR/80 (Oct. 26, 1951) (on file with the National Archive of 
France, AJ 43 132) (photo copy on file with author, 021) (recording the state-
ment of the Commissioner of the INS as he expressed his appreciation for the 
magnitude of the IRO’s displaced persons program and describing the program 
as the “most important phase of their work”); see also DINNERSTEIN, supra 
note 244, at 184 (describing how the Displaced Persons Commission hired in-
dividuals who had worked for UNRRA and the IRO and shared the outlook of 
these organizations). 
 259. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400 (1953). The IRO was 
created as a time-limited organization. It ceased operations in 1952 and was 
dissolved in 1953; the DPA sunset in 1952 accordingly. Pub. L. No. 81-555, § 8, 
64 Stat. 219, 225 (1950); HOLBORN, supra note 16, at 24. 
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ta system established by the 1952 Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA).260 The RRA also carried forward the 1950 amend-
ment to the DPA and prohibited the issuance of a visa for “any 
person who personally advocated or assisted in the persecution 
of any person or group of persons because of race, religion, or 
national origin.”261 
B. THE HOLTZMAN AMENDMENT OF 1978 INSERTS THE 
PERSECUTOR BAR INTO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 
With the Holtzman Amendment, Congress amended the 
INA to create grounds of exclusion and deportation for assisting 
in the persecution of others.262 Using the same language that 
appeared later in the Refugee Act, the amendments provided 
that a noncitizen was excludable or deportable if he “ordered, 
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of 
any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political 
opinion.”263 The amendment was limited, however, to persecu-
tion associated with the Nazis during World War II.264 The 
amendment also barred a grant of withholding of deportation—
the predecessor to one of the forms of protection included in the 
Refugee Act—on the same basis.265 
The legislative history described the amendment as closing 
“an undesirable loophole in current U.S. immigration law” that 
had allowed past persecutors to enter the United States 
through the INA, whereas, those individuals who had immi-
 
 260. Refugee Relief Act §§ 3–4. 
 261. Id. § 14(a). 
 262. Holtzman Amendment, Pub. L. 95-549, §§ 101, 103, 92 Stat. 2065, 
2065–66 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 3 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, 4702. 
 263. Holtzman Amendment §§ 212(a)(33), 241(a)(19) (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(33), 1251(a)(19) (1982)). 
 264. Section 212(a)(33) applied to aliens associated with the Nazis “during 
the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending on May 8, 1945.” Id. It 
made “[a]ny alien” deportable if the alien was under the direction of or in asso-
ciation with “the Nazi government” or “any government in any area occupied 
by the military forces of the Nazi government . . . or any government which 
was an ally of the Nazi government” that “ordered, incited, assisted, or other-
wise participated in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, 
national origin, or political opinion.” Id. 
 265. Id. Withholding of deportation was the precursor to withholding of 
removal. Similar to its current form, withholding of deportation prevented a 
noncitizen from being deported to any country in which an individual would be 
subject to persecution on account of race, religion, national origin, or political 
opinion. Id. § 243(h) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1978)). 
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grated under the DPA or the RRA were subject to the persecu-
tor bar.266 The amendment was prompted by renewed efforts to 
identify and deport former Nazis so that they could be tried for 
war crimes in their home countries.267 
The congressional report accompanying the amendment 
specifically acknowledged the inclusion of the persecutor bar in 
the DPA, the RRA and the IRO Constitution and explained that 
the amendment would “establish within the permanent U.S. 
immigration law a provision which has appeared previously in 
[these] special refugee measures.”268 The report also described 
the INA’s provision for withholding of deportation, in its 
amended form to include a persecutor bar, as meeting the 
United States’ obligations under the 1967 United Nations Pro-
tocol on the Status of Refugees and “coextensive” with the 1951 
United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees which 
were incorporated by the 1967 Protocol.269 
The report also makes explicit that the term “persecution” 
in the bar was understood to require deliberate and intentional 
action in accordance with the principles of liability for war 
crimes. Congress explicitly declined to include a definition for 
“persecution,” and in its report, the House Judiciary Committee 
acknowledged accordingly that the bar would require “difficult 
and very delicate determinations.”270 The Committee explained 
that administration of the bar should be guided by the “accept-
ed precept of international law that ‘persecution’ is a ‘crime 
against humanity,’”271 and that immigration officials should 
make case-by-case determinations “in accordance with the case 
law” that has developed around the admission of refugees and 
withholding of deportation “as well as international material on 
 
 266. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 4. 
 267. See Birnbaum, supra note 42, at 211; Black, supra note 37, at 1–9; K. 
Lesli Ligorner, Nazi Concentration Camp Guard Service Equals “Good Moral 
Character”?: United States v. Lindert, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 145, 156 
(1997); Lippman, supra note 86, at 51–52; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 4 
(discussing the work of the special investigation unit in the INS and the need 
for the legislative amendments to allow for deportation of two suspected Nazi 
war criminals who had been admitted under the INA, as opposed to the DPA 
or RRA, and thus were not deportable under current law). 
 268. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 4. 
 269. Id. at 5. For a discussion on the obligations created by the 1967 Unit-
ed Nations Protocol on the Status of Refugees, see infra Part III. 
 270. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 6–8. 
 271. Id. at 8. 
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the subject such as the opinions of the Nuremberg tribunals.”272 
Here, the committee specifically noted the definition of perse-
cution developed in the Nuremberg tribunals and the DPA con-
cerning the type and degree of harm involved.273 It further stat-
ed that “it is important to stress that the conduct envisioned 
must be of a deliberate and severe nature” and that where per-
secution is asserted as the result of a government statute or 
rule, it must be clear that “the objective of such statute or rule 
was to deliberately inflict severe harm or suffering on a partic-
ular person or group of persons based on race, religion, national 
origin, or political opinion.”274 
With the Holtzman Amendment, Congress moved the per-
secutor bar from isolated and circumscribed immigration initia-
tives to its major regulatory scheme so that the bar governed 
admission, deportation, and eligibility for protection as a refu-
gee. In doing so, Congress tied the bar’s scope to its role in the 
DPA, the jurisprudence of the war crimes tribunals, and to the 
common understanding of “persecution.” These sources respec-
tively required culpability, allowed for a duress defense, and 
designated deliberate action with a specific intent to cause 
harm. The amendment, and its corresponding legislative histo-
ry, consequently provides important insight into the congres-
sional understanding of the bar’s key sources. Congress in-
voked these same sources two years later when it included the 
persecutor bar in the Refugee Act of 1980. 
C. THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 RETAINS THE PERSECUTOR BAR 
The version of the persecutor bar at issue in Negusie was 
created by the Refugee Act of 1980.275 The Act created two basic 
forms of protection from persecution in one’s home country. The 
first is asylum, which is granted as a matter of agency discre-
tion, and requires an applicant to meet the definition of a refu-
gee.276 U.S. asylum law now also requires an applicant to apply 
within one-year of entry into the United States subject to cer-
tain exceptions for changed and extraordinary circumstances.277 
 
 272. Id. at 7. 
 273. Id. at 5–7 (referring to deliberate infliction of severe harm such that 
the action constitutes a “crime against humanity”). 
 274. Id. at 7. 
 275. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 203(e), § 243(h)(1)–(2), 94 
Stat. 102, 107 (1980). 
 276. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 277. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(B). 
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A refugee is defined to include a person who has left her coun-
try of nationality or residence and is unwilling to return to that 
country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion . . . .”278 If a nonciti-
zen is ineligible for asylum based on the one-year deadline or 
certain criminal convictions,279 she can apply for the second 
form of protection: withholding of removal.280 Withholding of 
removal provides fewer benefits and requires a higher likeli-
hood of future harm,281 but—like asylum—this form of protec-
tion in the Refugee Act prevented the noncitizen’s return to a 
country if the “alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in 
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion.”282 
The refugee definition in the Refugee Act incorporates the 
definition contained in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees.283 The Protocol requires States 
 
 278. Refugee Act § 101(a)(42). The full text provides the following defini-
tion: 
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality 
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any coun-
try in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or 
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . . 
Id. 
 279. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B). 
 280. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (disqualifying applicant from asylum for convic-
tion of an aggravated felony regardless of the sentence). 
 281. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that an individual with only a 
ten percent chance of being persecuted still may possess fear based on a “rea-
sonable possibility.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987). Follow-
ing this articulation, the ten percent standard has been used by federal courts 
and agency adjudicators as the probability of harm required in asylum claims. 
See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES, § 2.2, at 56 
n.17 (2015 ed.) (citing federal court decisions applying the ten percent stand-
ard). Withholding of removal also does not provide a path to lawful permanent 
residence and citizenship or the ability to reunify with family members living 
in the noncitizen’s home country. 
 282. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, sec. 243(h), § 203(e), 94 Stat. 
102, 107. The current version—found in United States Code 2012—of with-
holding of removal states that the harm must be “because of” race, religion, 
etc., but is otherwise unchanged. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). 
 283. U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. I(2), Jan. 31, 
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter U.N. Protocol]. The U.N. 
Protocol incorporated the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees. Id.; U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
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Parties to protect “refugees” through its mandate that “[n]o 
Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler ’) a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or po-
litical opinion.”284 
Though Congress mirrored the 1967 Protocol’s definition of 
a “refugee,” it did not mirror the Protocol’s exclusions. The Pro-
tocol disqualifies from protection anyone for whom there are 
“serious reasons” to believe that: 
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity, as def ined in the international instruments drawn 
up to make provision in respect of such crimes; 
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country 
of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee; 
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles 
of the United Nations.285 
The Protocol created a fourth exclusion by eliminating the 
prohibition on refoulement for “a refugee whom there are rea-
sonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
 
gees, art. I, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter U.N. 
Convention]. The refugee definition in the 1951 Convention was limited to 
“events occurring before 1 January 1951.” Id. at 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 
U.N.T.S. at 152. The definition also includes stateless individuals. Id. Article 
1B of the 1951 Convention allowed State Parties to interpret “events occurring 
before 1 January 1951” as limited to events in Europe or as events in Europe 
and elsewhere. Id. at 19 U.S.T. at 6262, 89 U.N.T.S. at 154. The Protocol’s 
“refugee” definition eliminated the geographical and temporal restrictions and 
covers anyone “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country,” or 
who is stateless and cannot return to her country of habitual residence due to 
a fear of persecution. See U.N. Protocol, supra, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 
at 268–70 (quoting the incorporated refugee definition from the U.N. Conven-
tion). Although the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol in 1968, it did 
not incorporate the obligations these agreements imposed until 1980. See 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 427–29 (discussing the history of the Refugee 
Act). The incorporation of the 1967 Protocol obligations came after legislative 
and executive compromise. See generally Anker & Posner, supra note 245, at 
16 (analyzing the Refugee Act’s compromises between legislative and execu-
tive control over refugee admission and the legislative trade-offs that produced 
the Act’s final text). 
 284. U.N. Protocol, supra note 283, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 
(quoting the incorporated restrictions found in the U.N. Convention). 
 285. Id. art. 1F, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (quoting the incor-
porated disqualifications contained in the U.N. Convention). 
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country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final 
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger 
to the community of that country.”286 
Congress, on the other hand, created a different set of ex-
clusions for asylum or withholding of removal, some of which 
have corollaries in the 1967 Protocol and others of which do 
not. Through the Refugee Act, Congress barred from protection 
a noncitizen if: 
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in 
the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; 
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a f inal judgment of a particu-
larly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the 
United States; 
(C) there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has commit-
ted a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the 
arrival of the alien in the United States; 
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger 
to the security of the United States.287 
Congress also doubly excluded “any person who ordered, 
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of 
any person on account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion” from the 
definition of a “refugee.”288 Where the Refugee Act’s second, 
third, and fourth exclusions have corollaries in the 1967 Proto-
col, the language of the persecutor bar does not appear in the 
Convention and Protocol. Conversely, the Protocol’s exclusion 
for individuals who have committed “a crime against the peace, 
a war crime, or a crime against humanity” and for individuals 
“guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations” do not appear explicitly in the Refugee Act. 
This apparent disconnect in scope of the exclusions is largely 
eliminated, however, by the legislative history describing the 
Refugee Act as consistent with the protections afforded by the 
1967 Protocol. 
At the time of its enactment, congressional statements 
made clear that the Refugee Act was intended to conform U.S. 
law to the major international refugee agreement to which it 
 
 286. Id. art. 33, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (quoting the incor-
porated “non-refoulement” exclusion from the U.N. Convention). 
 287. Refugee Act of 1980 § 203(e). These bars remain substantively the 
same today. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A) (2012); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B), (h)(2)(A)–
(D). 
 288. Refugee Act of 1980 § 201(a). 
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had acceded: the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees.289 That legislative history also explains that 
the U.N. Convention and Protocol should guide the scope of the 
Act’s exclusions. Notwithstanding the inclusion of the persecu-
tor bar in the definition of “refugee,” the House Judiciary 
Committee’s report on the Refugee Act declared that the Act 
will “finally bring United States law into conformity with the 
internationally-accepted [sic] definition of the term ‘refugee’ set 
forth in the [Convention and Protocol] . . . .”290 Specifically, the 
Committee explained that the bar is “consistent with the U.N. 
Convention (which does not apply to those who, inter alia, 
‘committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity’), and with the two special statutory enact-
ments under which refugees were admitted to this country af-
ter World War II, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and the 
Refugee Relief Act of 1953.”291 The Judiciary Committee further 
noted that the bar in the Refugee Act reflects the exception 
“provided in the Convention relating to aliens who have them-
selves participated in persecution . . . .”292 The Conference 
Committee adopted the House’s definition of refugee with the 
persecutor bar amendment, and described the final text as 
“incorporat[ing] the U.N. definition,” repeating “the under-
standing that [the refugee definition] is based directly upon the 
language of the Protocol and it is intended that the provision be 
construed consistent with the Protocol.”293 
 
 289. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.  
 290. H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 9 (1979); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 
19–20 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 160–61 
(adopting the “internationally-accepted [sic] definition of refugee contained in 
the U.N. Convention and Protocol” and noting that the withholding of removal 
provision is to be “construed consistent with the Protocol”); S. REP. NO. 96-256, 
at 4, 9 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144, 149 (stating that 
the Act’s refugee definition “will bring United States law into conformity with 
our international treaty obligations” and provide protection “to those who 
qualify under the terms of the United Nations Protocol”). 
 291. H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 10. 
 292. Id. at 18. The U.N. Convention and Protocol, however, lack the same 
explicit language. See supra notes 285, 287 and accompanying text. 
 293. H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 19–20; see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 9 
(stating Congress’s intention to “bring United States law into conformity with 
the internationally-accepted definition of the term ‘refugee’ set forth” in the 
Convention and Protocol); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 
(1999) (“As we explained in Cardoza-Fonseca, ‘one of [Congress’s] primary 
purposes’ in passing the Refugee Act was to implement the principles agreed 
to in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to 
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Thus, the legislative history reflects an understanding that 
the Act’s coverage was coextensive with the obligations created 
by the U.N. Convention and Protocol. Moreover, the statements 
reveal the congressional belief that these agreements were con-
sistent with the DPA and RRA in their exclusion of individuals 
who had participated in the persecution of others. The bar con-
tained in the Refugee Act is best interpreted by taking into ac-
count its parallel paths through both international and U.S. 
law and arriving at a definition that is consistent with both. 
The development of the persecutor bar in U.S. law did not 
end with the 1980 Refugee Act, however. In 1981, Congress 
added a persecutor bar to suspension of deportation, a form of 
discretionary immigration relief based on length of residency in 
the United States and hardship caused by deportation.294 The 
accompanying congressional report explained that the 1981 
changes incorporated the “strict policies” of the Holtzman 
Amendment to disqualify noncitizens “who have participated in 
the Nazis’ persecution of others.”295 Through the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 
1996, Congress replaced suspension of deportation with cancel-
lation of removal, which requires a longer period of residence, a 
stricter hardship standard, and contains more disqualifying 
criminal offenses.296 With these changes, Congress replaced the 
Nazi-specific persecutor bar created by the Holtzman Amend-
 
which the United States acceded in 1968.” (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987) (citation omitted)).  
 294. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 
97-116, sec. 18(h)(2), § 244(a), 95 Stat. 1611, 1620 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1982)). 
 295. H.R. REP. NO. 97-264, at 34 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2577, 2603. The Board interpreted the amendment to be retroactive to the 
1978 legislation as a result. In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 71 (B.I.A. 
1984). The amendment also barred Nazi persecutors from voluntary depar-
ture, a form of relief that allows a noncitizen to leave the United States with-
out receiving a formal deportation order that would affect the noncitizen’s fu-
ture immigration options and criminal penalties for illegal reentry. 
Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments § 18(h)(2). 
 296. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, sec. 304(a), § 240A(a)–(b), 110 Stat. 3009–544 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)–(b) (1997)); see also Nancy Morawetz, 
Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited 
Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1949 (2000) (describing 
the dramatic changes rendered by the 1996 reforms which greatly expanded 
the criminal ground for deportation and inadmissibility and greatly restricted 
the ability of noncitizens to seek relief from these charges). 
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ment with the general bar created by the Refugee Act, again 
connecting the iterations of the persecutor bar across U.S. im-
migration law.297 
In sum, the persecutor bar originated in the IRO Constitu-
tion. Congress incorporated it into the DPA, replicated it in the 
RRA, added it to several provisions of the INA through the 
Holtzman Amendment, included it in the Refugee Act, incorpo-
rated it into another form of relief in the INA, and finally in-
cluded it in changes made by the IIRIRA. The congressional 
statements associated with these acts describe the multiple ap-
pearances of the persecutor bar in U.S. law as consistent, and 
reference its common source in the IRO Constitution. The 
statements also refer to the international refugee agreements 
and the jurisprudence of the international war crimes tribunals 
as informing the meaning of the persecutor bar. 
The Fedorenko Court focused only on the persecutor bar 
contained in the DPA. The Negusie Court focused only on the 
bar in the Refugee Act. But the legislative history demonstrates 
that these Acts are intertwined. To arrive at a coherent inter-
pretation that is consistent with congressional intent, the im-
migration agency should therefore consider the bar’s long histo-
ry and the international sources Congress repeatedly invoked. 
The next Part describes how these sources apply the nascent 
requirement for culpability displayed by IRO administrators 
and create a coherent doctrine in the form of the duress de-
fense. 
IV.  CONVERGENCE IN THE DURESS DEFENSE   
After Negusie, the agency must arrive at an interpretation 
of the persecutor bar that harmonizes the various statements of 
congressional intent and ascribes the same meaning to the 
same language that appears both inside and outside the Refu-
gee Act.298 I contend that the sources on which Congress relied 
when including the persecutor bar within the Refugee Act con-
verge in a requirement for personal culpability in order for an 
act to disqualify someone from humanitarian protection and 
that culpability in this context is best measured through the 
 
 297. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
§ 304(a). 
 298. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014) 
(“[I]dentical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have 
the same meaning.” (citing Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 
574 (2007))). 
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defense of duress.299 This Part first examines how the exclu-
sions from protection contained in the U.N. Convention and 
Protocol on the Status of Refugees were rooted in principles de-
veloped by the military tribunals created to try war crimes. I 
then discuss the standards used by these tribunals to assign 
culpability and their recognition of duress as a defense. Next, I 
describe how these standards are reflected in the practices of 
other States Parties in their implementation of the U.N. Con-
vention and Protocol. Finally, this Part concludes with a dis-
cussion of the immigration agency’s use of duress as a defense 
to similar exclusions in another provision of immigration law 
and asserts that incorporating duress into the interpretation of 
the persecutor bar is necessary to effecting congressional in-
tent. 
When including the persecutor bar in the Refugee Act, 
Congress pointed to the RRA, the DPA, and the U.N. Conven-
tion and Protocol and concluded that the bar was consistent 
with all three.300 The congressional Committee report accompa-
nying the Holtzman Amendment, which added a version of the 
persecutor bar to the prior form of refugee protection, features 
the most comprehensive discussion of the bar, and cites these 
three sources, as well as the Nuremberg Military Tribunals.301 
Consequently, I look first at the requirements for blamewor-
thiness present in both the U.N. Convention and Protocol that 
generated the Refugee Act and in the military tribunals that 
informed the meaning of the bar in the INA.  
Because Congress intended the Refugee Act to conform 
U.S. law to the U.N. Convention and Protocol, the scope of the 
exclusions in the international agreements is critical to the 
persecutor bar’s proper interpretation in U.S. law.302  
 
 299. See supra notes 20–32 and accompanying text (discussing the concept 
of culpability and its related components). 
 300. See supra notes 289–93 and accompanying text (discussing congres-
sional statements regarding the Refugee Act). 
 301. See supra notes 268–74 (discussing congressional statements regard-
ing the Holtzman Amendment). 
 302. See supra notes 289–93 and accompanying text (describing the legisla-
tive history of the Refugee Act). Attorney General Ashcroft stated that because 
the 1967 Protocol is not self-executing, it cannot serve as an independent 
source of rights and protections for refugees. In re D-J-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 
584 n.8 (Att’y Gen. 2003). Instead, the protections are defined by and limited 
to Congress’s provisions in the Refugee Act. Id. Nonetheless, Congress’s intent 
to incorporate the protection obligations created by the 1967 Protocol is well-
established. The conference report issued with the final text of the Refugee Act 
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The exclusions contained in the Convention and Protocol 
were based on the documents that framed the military tribu-
nals following World War II, specifically the Charter of the In-
ternational Military Tribunals. An early draft of the 1951 U.N. 
Convention explicitly cited the Charter in its first exclusion.303 
The Charter for the International Military Tribunal defined 
the crimes to be tried by the International Military Tribunal.304 
These offenses included “crimes against peace,” “war crimes,” 
and “crimes against humanity.”305 The Charter described 
“crimes against humanity” as “murder, extermination, en-
slavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during the war; or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execu-
tion of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetuated.”306 Control Council Law No. 10, 
in turn, authorized the Allied governments to create additional 
tribunals through which to try individuals charged with the 
 
states that the “four specific conditions,” which serve as exceptions to the 
guarantee of nonrefoulement, match “those set forth in the aforementioned in-
ternational agreements.” H.R. REP. NO. 96-78,1 at 20, (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 161; see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 
U.S. 415, 427 (1999); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 US 421, 425 (1987); INS v. 
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425–26 (1984) (discussing the legislative intent of the 
Refugee Act). Additionally, the Supreme Court has made clear that statutes 
should not be interpreted so as to violate U.S. treaty obligations absent a clear 
statement from Congress. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 
466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
 303. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 16, at 163–65; U.N. High 
Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees, ¶¶ 148, 150, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992) 
[hereinafter “UNHCR Handbook”]. This initial draft also referenced Article 14 
of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides: 
1. Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum 
from persecution. 
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely 
arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes 
and principles of the United Nations. 
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 14, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
 304. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis, and the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1556 [hereinafter Charter]. 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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crimes defined by the Charter.307 The U.S. created the Nurem-
berg Military Tribunals for this purpose.308 The final version of 
the U.N. Convention’s first exclusion was revised to reference 
the Charter more generally while explicitly referring to the 
same list of offenses that were defined in the Charter.309 As the 
text indicates, the Convention’s drafters sought to tie the exclu-
sions from protection to the offenses for which World War II’s 
major war criminals had been tried.310 Some sources indicate 
that the persecutor bar in U.S. law is encompassed by the first 
exclusion in the Convention and Protocol; others tie it to the 
third exclusion.311 Either way, the exclusions contained in the 
Convention and Protocol that Congress incorporated through 
the Refugee Act were built on the international military tribu-
nals. Consequently, the U.N. guidance on the meaning of these 
exclusions looks to these tribunals as a guide.312 
The tribunals demonstrate that determining culpability 
requires a two-step analysis: (1) are the actions committed suf-
ficient to constitute one of the defined offenses that gives rise 
to an exclusion; and (2) if so, is there an available defense such 
as duress? With respect to the first step, more than mere mem-
bership in a group that has engaged in the persecution of oth-
 
 307. 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRI-
BUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at XVI–XVII, XXI (1949). 
 308. Id. at XXI (citing Ordinance No. 7). 
 309. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 16, at 163–65. The final text of 
Article 1(F)(a) provides that the Convention shall not apply to any person who 
has “committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against human-
ity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in 
respect of such crimes.” U.N. Convention, supra note 283, at 156. 
 310. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 16, at 173–76; JAMES C. 
HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 567 (2d ed. 
2014); ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 66–67. 
 311. The first exclusion lists “crimes against humanity.” The third exclu-
sion replicates the language from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which was explicitly referenced in the initial draft of the exclusion for 
war criminals. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 16, at 184. The prevail-
ing view is that the exclusion is limited to heads of State and high officials, but 
includes individuals not necessarily connected with a government who have 
engaged in extreme violations of human rights. Id. at 184–90 (noting that the 
British representative for the United Nations supposed that this article cov-
ered war crimes, genocide and the subversion or overthrow of democratic re-
gimes). The UNHCR Handbook discusses these two exclusions as overlapping 
and explains that the third exclusion is directed at individuals in positions of 
power. UNHCR Handbook ¶¶ 162–63.  
 312. See infra notes 355–62 and accompanying text.  
  
2016] DRAWING LINES 527 
 
ers is required for the exclusion to be triggered. The Interna-
tional Military Tribunal declared: 
Since the declaration with respect to the organizations and groups 
will, as has been pointed out, f ix the criminality of its members, that 
def inition should exclude persons who had no knowledge of the crim-
inal purposes or acts of the organization and those who were drafted 
by the State for membership, unless they were personally implicated 
in the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter 
as members of the organization. Membership alone is not enough to 
come within the scope of these declarations.313 
The military tribunals convened by various Allied forces, 
including the United States, followed suit and evaluated an ac-
cused’s rank, responsibilities, and knowledge of the actions of 
the group to which he was a part before convicting him of 
crimes against humanity or the other offenses laid out in the 
Charter.314 
The tribunals’ requirements for knowledge and direct in-
volvement in the commission of an offense mirrors the ap-
proach taken by the IRO administrators. Membership in a per-
secutory group created a presumption that the persecutor bar 
applied but could be rebutted with evidence that an individual 
did not personally participate in the harms caused by the 
group. It also aligns with Massey’s framework to analyze indi-
vidual responsibility for collective actions, which proposed lia-
bility under the persecutor bar only where the individual per-
sonally participated in the harm or where he had knowledge of 
the acts of the group and directly contributed to those acts.315 
Massey too asserted that membership alone in a group whose 
objective was to persecute others was insufficient to trigger the 
bar.316 The requirements for knowledge and a direct contribu-
tion to the harm, however, conflict with the BIA’s objective ef-
fects test, which demands neither knowledge of the organiza-
tion’s acts nor personal participation in the harm caused before 
applying the persecutor bar.317  
 
 313. 15 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIM-
INALS 151 (1949) (citing British Command Paper, cmd. 6964, 67 (second em-
phasis added)). 
 314. Id. at 151–54 (discussing the Flick and I.G. Farben trials conducted by 
the U.S. Military Tribunal in Nuremberg as well as the Polish and Dutch ap-
plications of the same principles). 
 315. Massey, supra note 16, at 145–47. 
 316. Id. at 147. 
 317. In re Fedorenko, 19 I. & N. Dec. 57, 69 (B.I.A. 1984) (stating that the 
“objective effect” test did not require personal participation in persecution). 
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The military tribunals defined not only the crimes incorpo-
rated into the Convention and Protocol, but also established 
their defenses. One such defense was duress. The International 
Military Tribunal explained the concept in its judgment in the 
Trial of the Major War Criminals in Nuremberg, Germany. It 
discussed the governing law of its Charter and the principle of 
individual culpability for war crimes committed pursuant to a 
policy of a State.318 The Tribunal explained that “[c]rimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by ab-
stract entities” and that the individuals who commit them must 
be punished in order to enforce international law.319 Evidence 
that a crime was committed under orders from a superior could 
thus not negate culpability but only mitigate punishment.320 In-
stead, to establish a cognizable defense, the Tribunal stated 
that “[t]he true test . . . is not the existence of the order, but 
whether moral choice was in fact possible.”321 So long as there 
was moral choice there was culpability. 
The question became how to determine whether moral 
choice was truly absent. The United Nations War Crimes 
Commission articulated a general standard for duress based on 
its examination of over 1900 decisions by military tribunals as 
well as British, American, and European laws on duress. The 
report concluded that duress is an available defense if: “(a) the 
act charged was done to avoid an immediate danger both seri-
ous and irreparable; (b) there was no adequate means of es-
cape; (c) the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil.”322 
The United States Nuremberg Military Tribunals likewise 
employed a test for duress formulated in different ways in dif-
ferent cases but with the same ultimate purpose of evaluating 
freedom of choice. One trial looked at whether the accused was 
threatened with a “clear and present danger” at the time he 
used forced labor;323 another followed the International Military 
Tribunal’s articulation and examined whether the circumstanc-
es surrounding an order from a superior are “such . . . as to af-
 
 318. INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 176, at 222–23. 
 319. Id. at 223. 
 320. Id. at 224. 
 321. Id. 
 322. U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, supra note 313, at 174. 
 323. The Flick Case, in 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 
1196–1201 (1952) [hereinafter The Flick Case]; U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, 
supra note 313, at 171. 
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ford the one receiving it of no other moral choice than to comply 
therewith”;324 a third required “a showing of circumstances such 
that a reasonable man would apprehend that he was in such 
imminent physical peril as to deprive him of freedom to choose 
the right and refrain from the wrong.”325 The U.S. tribunal act-
ing in the Einsatzgruppen trial expressed: 
[T]here is no law which requires that an innocent man must forfeit 
his life or suffer serious harm in order to avoid committing a crime 
which he condemns. The threat, however, must be imminent, real, 
and inevitable. No court will punish a man who, with a loaded pistol 
at his head, is compelled to pull a lethal lever.326 
The meaning of these requirements for duress is illustrated 
in the different decisions of the United States Nuremberg Mili-
tary Tribunals. The Flick trial addresses how the requirement 
for a threat of imminent serious harm was applied. The prose-
cution contended that the defendants had failed to show a 
“clear and present” danger that resulted in their use of slave 
labor to meet the Nazis’ industrial production quotas.327 The de-
fendants argued that objecting to the Reich’s allocation of labor 
would be treated as treason or sabotage and potentially pun-
ished with death.328 The U.S. tribunal found the threat to be 
sufficiently imminent, looking to the full scope of the governing 
regime.329 It concluded that the German government imposed a 
 
 324. The I.G. Farben Case, in 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 
1176 (1952) [hereinafter The I.G. Farben Case]; U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, 
supra note 313, at 171. 
 325. U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, supra note 313, at 171–72 (discussing the 
High Command trial). 
 326. The Einsatzgruppen Case, in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 
at 480 (1950) [hereinafter The Einsatzgruppen Case]; U.N. WAR CRIMES 
COMM’N, supra note 313, at 174. The United States was not alone in articulat-
ing a similar standard for duress. In a trial before a British Military Tribunal, 
the Judge Advocate addressed the accused’s assertion of duress as a defense 
and said, “If you are contemplating that possibly this threat of death may pro-
vide a defense then let me ask you not to give effect to it unless you think that 
he really was in danger of imminent death and that the evil threatened him 
was on balance greater than the evil which he was called upon to perpetuate.” 
Id. at 172 (discussing the trial of Gustav Alfred Jepsen). Tribunals convened 
by other countries expressed some disagreement over whether duress could 
provide a full defense to taking an innocent life, but recognized the defense in 
the context of lesser harms. Id. at 173. 
 327. The Flick Case, supra note 323, at 1201. 
 328. Id. at 1197–99. 
 329. Id. at 1201. 
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“constant ‘reign of terror’” and that agents of the Reich were 
“ready to go into instant action and to mete out savage and 
immediate punishment against anyone doing anything that 
could be construed as obstructing or hindering the carrying out 
of government regulations or decrees.”330 The tribunal, however, 
did not acquit several of the co-defendants because they took 
initiative to request slave labor and therefore could not show 
that the harm they inflicted was limited to what was required 
under threat.331 
The Farben trial involved similar charges concerning 
crimes against humanity for the use of slave labor in response 
to the Reich’s requirement that it produce chemicals used in 
the mass killings at the concentration camps.332 The U.S. tribu-
nal looked to the standard described in the Flick trial and de-
termined that the company’s leadership could not make out the 
defense of duress because they had gone above and beyond 
what was required by the Reich’s labor allocation program. The 
leadership had taken the initiative to replace POW workers 
with concentration camp inmates to avoid labor unrest, and 
thus were not acting under threat.333 However, the plant man-
agers were not found guilty because they had not exercised ini-
tiative in obtaining forced labor, and they demonstrated that 
they had “withheld, at no little risk, their cooperation.”334 In ef-
fect, they were no more than members in a persecutory group, 
making no moral choice to inflict harm. 
In the Einsatzgruppen case, the U.S. tribunal contended 
with the requirement for moral opposition that justifies the de-
fense of duress.335 In other words, if someone does not object to 
harming another and harms that person, then he should be 
culpable for his action because he agreed with his coercer that 
harming another is correct.336 Duress excuses liability only be-
 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 1202. 
 332. The I.G. Farben Case, supra note 324, at 1176. 
 333. Id. at 1192. The same was true in the Krupp case based on evidence 
that the leadership of the arms manufacturer had requested slave labor along-
side evidence that other armament firms had refused to request concentration 
camp labor (e.g., there was a reasonable means of escape). The Krupp Case, in 
9 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1412 (1951) [hereinafter The Krupp 
Case]. 
 334. The I.G. Farben Case, supra note 324, at 1192–94. 
 335. See The Einsatzgruppen Case, supra note 326. 
 336. The Krupp Case, supra note 333, at 1439 (“In such cases, if, in the ex-
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cause it recognizes that one should not be culpable for harming 
others when there was no reasonable possibility to exercise 
one’s moral choice not to perpetuate that harm.337 Consequent-
ly, moral objection is a predicate to pleading duress. The tribu-
nal in the Einsatzgruppen case enforced the need for moral ob-
jection through the requirement to demonstrate that there was 
no reasonable means to escape harming others.338 The defend-
ants were leaders of the task forces that implemented Hitler’s 
Final Solution and were thus charged with a staggering scale of 
atrocities.339 The tribunal rejected the defendants’ claims that 
refusing to follow orders would have been futile.340 Instead, it 
required evidence that the defendants had tried to avoid inflict-
ing the harm ordered.341 The tribunal pointed to others who had 
fled Germany or had demonstrated efforts to disassociate 
themselves from the task forces.342 It explained that the “de-
fendants must have found themselves repeatedly at the cross-
roads where and when there was still the opportunity to turn in 
the direction of the ideals which they had once known, but the 
willful determination to follow the trail of blood prints of their 
voluntarily accepted leader could only take them to the goal 
they had never intended.”343 The absence of evidence that the 
defendants had ever tried to do anything but implement the or-
ders was condemning. The only defendant to escape liability in 
this tribunal demonstrated his limited time in the Nazi task 
force, his forced conscription into it, and his efforts to escape 
it.344  
In the High Command trial, the tribunal made more strin-
gent the requirement for resistance of an order (which serves as 
 
ecution of the illegal act, the will of the accused be not thereby overpowered 
but instead coincides with the will of those from whom the alleged compulsion 
emanates, there is no necessity justifying the illegal conduct.”). 
 337. See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Ex-
cuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1367 (1989) 
(describing duress as a normative excuse which asks “in light of the nature of 
the demand and the expected repercussions from noncompliance, [could we] 
fairly expect a person of nonsaintly moral strength to resist the threat” (em-
phasis and footnote omitted)). 
 338. The Einsatzgruppen Case, supra note 326. 
 339. Id. at 369–70. 
 340. Id. at 482. 
 341. Id. at 482, 506. 
 342. Id. at 506–07, 584–87. 
 343. Id. at 508. 
 344. Id. at 584–87. 
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the evidence of duress’s second prong: one’s inability to escape 
engaging in the offending conduct). The tribunal demanded 
that the higher the rank of the officer, the more he needed to 
demonstrate his attempts to repudiate a directive to commit a 
crime against humanity in order to avoid liability for that di-
rective. Consequently, a high ranking officer had to show that 
he had taken every possible step to thwart an illegal directive 
short of action that would result in his serious injury or 
death.345 The only defendant to successfully claim duress in this 
tribunal demonstrated the immediate and severe consequences 
of refusing the order or of resigning and showed that he did not 
actually disseminate the order to his subordinates.346 
The Krupp trial contributed to this developing jurispru-
dence by discussing the proportionality requirement and the 
relevance of subjective evidence. The Krupp defendants con-
sisted of the leadership of the major armaments company in 
Germany.347 The company’s head was close to Hitler and the 
company worked closely with the SS; the company itself had 
special dispensation from Hitler to remain privately owned.348 
These defendants attempted to invoke the defense of duress in 
response to charges of crimes against humanity for using slave 
labor as the Flick and Farben industrialist defendants had 
done with varying degrees of success. The U.S. tribunal reject-
ed the defense largely based on substantial evidence that the 
defendants had initiated the use of slave labor and that it was 
not forced upon them.349 It also noted that the defendants were 
particularly well protected, given their political connections, 
and thus the threats that may have been employed against 
other industrialists were not present here.350 Consequently, the 
tribunal concluded that the defense amounted to a claim that 
“[t]o avoid losing my job or the control of my property, I am 
warranted in employing thousands of civilian deportees, pris-
oners of war, and concentration camp inmates; keeping them in 
a state of involuntary servitude; exposing them daily to death 
 
 345. The High Command Case, in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE 
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 
at 598 (1951). Again, the culpability of a commander was not established by 
the persecutory acts of another without evidence of “personal dereliction” that 
resulted in a voluntary, criminal act. Id. at 543, 598. 
 346. Id. at 557–78. 
 347. The Krupp Case, supra note 333, at 1332. 
 348. Id. at 1445–46. 
 349. Id. at 1412–16, 1439. 
 350. Id. at 1445. 
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or great bodily harm under conditions which did in fact result 
in the deaths of many of them.”351 It concluded that the remedy 
was disproportionate to the evil and that the threat of loss of 
property will not support a claim of duress.352 Thus, the rela-
tionship between the individual claiming duress and the coerc-
er must be assessed, as not all subjects of a coercive force are 
equally positioned to comply or resist. This principle is also re-
flected in the tribunal’s recognition that subjective evidence is 
relevant to assess if “the contemplated compulsion . . . actually 
operate[s] upon the will of the accused to the extent that he is 
thereby compelled to do what otherwise he would not have 
done.”353 This question must be “determined from the stand-
point of the honest belief of the particular accused in ques-
tion.”354 
The U.N. General Assembly affirmed the principles set out 
in the Charter and Judgment of the International Military Tri-
bunal.355 The year after the U.N.’s Law Reports were issued, the 
U.N. International Law Commission reviewed these standards 
for culpability and recognized that a duress defense was well 
established.356 These sources then informed the exclusions in 
the Convention and Protocol, tying the standard for culpability 
for war crimes to the limitations on humanitarian protection.357 
Following the principles articulated by the international 
tribunals, the documents developed by the United Nations 
High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) interpreting the ex-
clusions contained in the 1967 Protocol build on this jurispru-
dence to assess both in the level of action taken and the availa-
bility of a defense before excluding an applicant. The UNHCR’s 
Exclusion Guidelines set out the principle that all exclusions be 
interpreted restrictively, “with great caution,” and “only after a 
 
 351. Id. at 1444–45. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 1439. 
 354. Id. at 1438. 
 355. See G.A. Res. 95(I), at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946). 
 356. See J. Spiropoulos (Special Rapporteur), Draft Code of Offences 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/25 at 275 
(1950); see also Brief for Scholars of International Refugee Law as Amici Curi-
ae in Support of Petitioner at 28–31, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) 
(No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2550611, at *7–11 (describing the connection between 
the international military tribunals and the exclusions contained in the 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol). 
 357. HATHAWAY, supra note 310, at 567; ROBINSON, supra note 16, at 66–
67. 
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full assessment of the individual circumstances of the case.”358 
These Guidelines first require “individual responsibility [to] be 
established in relation to a crime” listed, which requires, at a 
minimum, a “substantial contribution to the commission of a 
criminal act, in the knowledge that his or her act or omission 
would facilitate the criminal conduct.”359 Membership, per se, is 
not enough to support exclusion under the Convention and Pro-
tocol.360 If the requisite level of action is present such that an 
exclusion may be triggered, the UNHCR interprets the U.N. 
Convention and Protocol to allow the defense of duress. The de-
fense arises “where the act in question results from the person 
concerned necessarily and reasonably avoiding a threat of im-
minent death, or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm 
to him- or herself or another person, and the person does not 
intend to cause greater harm than the one sought to be avoid-
ed.”361 An accompanying Background Note quotes a statement 
from the International Military Tribunal as the source of this 
requirement: “The criterion for criminal responsibility . . . lies 
in moral freedom, in the perpetrator’s ability to choose with re-
spect to the act of which he is accused.”362 
 
 358. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protec-
tion: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05, ¶ 2 (Sept.  
4, 2003) [hereinafter Exclusion Guidelines], http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/ 
publications/legal/3f7d48514/guidelines-international-protection-5-application 
-exclusion-clauses-article.html; see also Background Note on the Application of 
the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 502, 503 (2003) [hereinafter Background 
Note] (“[T]he exclusion clauses must always be interpreted restrictively and 
should be used with great caution.”). 
 359. Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 358, ¶¶ 18, 21. Background Note, 
supra note 358, at 502–03 (explaining the relationship between the Exclusion 
Guidelines, Background Note, and UNHCR Handbook). See generally INS v. 
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999) (describing the Handbook as a “use-
ful interpretive aid”); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987) 
(acknowledging the UNHCR Handbook as providing “significant guidance” to 
the terms of the obligations created by the 1967 U.N. Protocol).  
 360. Exclusion Guidelines, supra note 358, ¶ 19. 
 361. Id. ¶ 22; see also Background Note, supra note 358, at 527 (stating the 
duress defense applies only when the applicant’s intended harm is not greater 
than the harm avoided). 
 362. Background Note, supra note 358, at 521; see also id. at 527 (quoting 
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, 
5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at Principle IV, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), and explain-
ing that the defense of superior orders does not absolve the accused “provided 
a moral choice was in fact possible for him”). 
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Given the history behind the exclusions in the Convention 
and Protocol and the U.N.’s corresponding interpretation to re-
quire culpability, other States Parties to the 1967 Protocol rec-
ognize duress as a defense to the Protocol’s exclusion clauses as 
a result.363 Various Canadian courts have recognized duress as 
permitting the commission of one of the exclusionary crimes 
provided that the harm avoided by the applicant for protection 
is greater than the harm actually inflicted on the victim.364 
Courts in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom 
have similarly weighed the degree of pressure exerted on the 
applicant and the availability of moral choice to determine 
whether the individual is disqualified from protection.365 
 
 363. Fatma Marouf argues that U.S. courts should look to the interpreta-
tions by other States Parties to the 1967 Protocol when analyzing the meaning 
of the Refugee Act. She contends that the principle of treaty interpretation 
that gives the opinions of sister signatories considerable weight should like-
wise apply to U.S. statutes that are incorporative of international treaties 
such as the meaning of “refugee” in the Refugee Act. Fatma Marouf, The Role 
of Foreign Authorities in U.S. Asylum Adjudication, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 391, 399–420 (2013). The proper level of authority courts should give to 
the interpretations of the Protocol’s exclusions is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. Rather, the decisions of other States Parties demonstrate an interpreta-
tion of the Protocol’s exclusions consistent with the one asserted here and de-
rived from the same sources invoked by Congress when it enacted the Refugee 
Act. 
 364. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Asghedom, [2001] F.C. 972 
(Can. Fed. Ct.) (affirming the Immigration Board’s finding that Respondent, 
who was a citizen of Eritrea living in Ethiopia, acted under duress when he 
was forcibly recruited into the Ethiopian military at age eighteen where he 
stood guard during raids of civilian homes, pushed people onto trucks for 
transfer to military camp where they were tortured and killed, and buried 
dead bodies); Ramirez v. Minister of Emp. & Immigration, [1992] 2 F.C. 306 
(Can. Fed. Ct.) (finding that the punishment the Appellant, a citizen of El Sal-
vador, would have endured for deserting the military was much less than the 
acts he committed as a member of the military where he was responsible for 
capturing, torturing and killing victims). 
 365. See, e.g., W97/164 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs 
1998 ATTA 618, ¶ 79 (Austl.) (finding that the applicant, a citizen of Burma, 
who participated in the shooting of fleeing activists as a member of the Bur-
mese Navy, was not excluded from refugee protection under Article 1(F)); Ref-
ugee Appeal No 2142 (1997) NZRSAA 92 (granting the applicant, a citizen of 
Sri Lanka, refugee status even though he was forced to become a member of 
the LTTE, and had to help recruit members, provide dynamite used against 
the government, and store LTTE belongings at his house); KK v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Dep’t, [2004] UKIAT 00101, (U.K. Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal) (finding that duress is grounds for rejecting individual responsibility 
under U.N. Convention Article 1F(c) “where the act in question results from 
the person concerned . . . avoiding a threat of imminent death, or of continuing 
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In addition, the various agencies charged with administer-
ing the immigration law have created a duress defense for a 
similar bar to admissibility. The INA includes a terrorism-
related inadmissibility ground (TRIG) that covers a wide range 
of activity, including a minimal amount of support to certain 
militant organizations and military training by these groups.366 
In recognition of the fact some of the activity that falls within 
the scope of the TRIG-bar may be coerced—such as the training 
of a child soldier by a rebel group or succumbing to the demand 
for food by guerilla actors, the Department of Homeland Securi-
ty, the Department of State, and the Attorney General have col-
laborated to issue standards for formal exemptions to the 
TRIG-bar for actions taken under duress.367 The standard em-
ployed for the duress exemption in this context includes the 
same basic elements as the military tribunals required. The ac-
tion must be taken “in response to a reasonably-perceived 
threat of serious harm.”368 And the adjudicator is instructed to 
consider: 
whether the applicant reasonably could have avoided, or took steps to 
avoid, providing material support; the severity and type of harm in-
f licted or threatened; to whom the harm or threat of harm was di-
rected (e.g., the applicant, the applicant’s family, the applicant’s 
community, etc.); the perceived imminence of the harm threatened; 
the perceived likelihood that the threatened harm would be inf licted 
(e.g., based on instances of past harm to the applicant, to the appli-
cant’s family, to the applicant’s community, and the manner in which 
harm was threatened, etc.) 
among other circumstantial factors.369 While parsed differently 
than the duress requirements set out by United Nations War 
 
or imminent serious bodily harm to him or herself or another person, and the 
person does not intend to cause greater harm than the one sought to be avoid-
ed”).  
 366. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
 367. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY UNDER SEC-
TION 212(d)(3)(B)(i) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (2011) (receiv-
ing military-type training under duress); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EX-
ERCISE OF AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 212(d)(3)(B)(i) OF THE IMMIGRATION 
AND NATIONALITY ACT (2011) (solicitation under duress); U.S. DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SEC., EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY UNDER SEC. 212(d)(3)(B)(i) OF THE IMMI-
GRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (2007) (material support for terrorist activities 
under duress).  
 368. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PROCESSING THE DISCRETIONARY EX-
EMPTION TO THE INADMISSIBILITY GROUND FOR PROVIDING MATERIAL SUP-
PORT TO CERTAIN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS (2007). 
 369. Id. The other duress exemptions replicate and reference the standard 
described in this memorandum. 
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Crimes Commission, the need to show a serious pending threat 
and the inability to choose a different action are the same. The 
agency’s test in this context also considers the coerced person’s 
subjective perspective. 
The culpability principles established by the international 
military tribunals permeate the bar’s history in U.S. law. The 
IRO eligibility directives, the congressional report accompany-
ing the Holtzman Amendment, and the report accompanying 
the Refugee Act, each discuss the persecutor bar in conjunction 
with “crimes against humanity” as that offense was applied by 
international military tribunals. Additionally, when Congress 
amended the INA to add a persecutor bar to admission and 
withholding of deportation, it specifically cited the jurispru-
dence of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal in discussing the 
meaning of “persecution” and the bar’s conformance with the 
U.N. Convention and Protocol.370 
Consequently, incorporating duress into the agency’s in-
terpretation of the persecutor bar would achieve consistency 
with the three sources on which Congress repeatedly drew 
when enacting the bars: (1) the IRO Constitution as adopted by 
the DPA; (2) the exclusions contained in the U.N. Convention 
and Protocol; and (3) the liability principles developed by the 
military tribunals after World War II.371 A duress defense to the 
persecutor bar would also create consistency with the immigra-
tion agency’s policy in other similar contexts. The IRO cases 
and directives preserved in the Archive did not explicitly con-
sider claims of duress with respect to the persecutor bar.372 In-
stead, the cases reflect an inchoate requirement for culpability, 
but not a coherent standard. The international military tribu-
nals, however, developed that standard and applied the duress 
defense to crimes involving the persecution of civilian popula-
tions. The same is true for the interpretation of the exclusions 
in the U.N. Convention and Protocol and their implementation 
 
 370. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1452, at 2–3 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, 4702. 
 371. See supra Parts III–IV. 
 372. Notably, however, the leader of the IRO foreshadowed this defense. 
When reconsidering the eligibility status of members of the Baltic SS units in 
light of evidence from the military tribunals that forced recruits often chose 
these units for their favorable conditions, the IRO Director-General stated 
that “only some form of duress on the part of the Germans should be held to 
excuse an apparently voluntary act.” IRO Exec. Comm. Memo, supra note 195 
(on file with the National Archive of France, AJ # 43 131) (photo copy on file 
with author, 77). 
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by numerous States Parties: evidence of duress defeats exclu-
sion. Given this history and the statements of congressional in-
tent, the immigration agency should embrace the opportunity 
provided by the Supreme Court to reconsider the bar in full and 
follow suit. 
  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
The objective effects test articulated by the BIA in In re 
Laipenieks cannot stand.373 This interpretation of the persecu-
tor bar is inconsistent with international treaty obligations; in-
consistent with statements of congressional intent; inconsistent 
with the humanitarian purpose of the many refugee acts Con-
gress has passed; and inconsistent with the bar’s historical 
source. After Negusie, the immigration agency has the oppor-
tunity to correct this interpretation and incorporate culpability 
whether through precedential decision-making or formal rule-
making.374 
Measuring moral choice through the defense of duress 
would resolve these inconsistencies. Duress requires more than 
the measure of outside influence sufficient to demonstrate in-
voluntariness. It exculpates only individuals subject to a level 
of influence so great as to eliminate the ability to choose a 
morally correct course of conduct. The defense requires an im-
minent and serious threat of harm, no means of escape or al-
ternative action, and causing no more harm to others than the 
harm threatened against them. It allows for consideration of 
circumstance and counters the notion of willfulness that is in-
herent in the term “persecution.” By placing the burden on the 
applicant, the defense tests an individual’s moral opposition to 
the aims of his coercer through the requirement of pursuing all 
reasonable means of escape, and consequently the test pro-
motes resistance to participating in persecution, not complicity. 
Justices Scalia and Alito suggest a blanket exclusion may be 
appropriate because it would substitute concerns for “culpabil-
 
 373. In re Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 465 (B.I.A. 1983), rev’d, 
Laipenieks v. INS, 750 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 374. The Department of Homeland Security’s Supplemental Brief explains 
that the agency was engaged in rulemaking efforts prior to the BIA’s issuance 
of its most recent briefing schedule and that the agency will continue to ad-
vance its rulemaking efforts in parallel. DHS Supplemental Brief at 2 n.3, In 
re Negusie, No. A 015 575 924 (B.I.A. brief filed Apr. 20, 2016) (on file with the 
author). 
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ity” with concerns for “desirability.”375 But someone who aided 
his persecutor only under duress does not lack moral character 
and is not inherently undesirable; he is simply a victim. 
Massey’s work guides courts in answering the question of 
what acts make an individual culpable for the harm caused by 
a collective. The contribution of an armed guard, and interpret-
er, or a police interrogator is enough even if neither the guard, 
nor the interpreter, nor the interrogator personally harmed the 
victim.376 The contribution of a low-level office clerk in a police 
force controlled by the SS is not, however.377 Massey’s test thus 
assesses whether someone has sufficiently participated in the 
persecution of others so as to trigger the bar. But it does not 
complete the culpability analysis when participation is undis-
puted but moral choice is. Here, the defense of duress steps in. 
Allowing a duress defense may lead to the same outcomes 
in Fedorenko and Negusie but would do so with a coherent and 
complete rationale.378 The Court in Fedorenko did not consider 
the defense of duress.379 It determined only that the DPA’s per-
secutor bar did not contain an “‘involuntary assistance’ excep-
tion.”380 Indeed, in drawing lines between concentration camp 
inmates forced to participate in the horrific functions of Tre-
blinka and the prisoners of war who were standing guard, the 
Court looked to factors that evidenced moral choice. It empha-
sized the fact that Fedorenko was armed, that Russian soldiers 
outnumbered their SS captors, that they were paid and able to 
leave the camp, that other guards had escaped, and that 
Fedorenko admitted to shooting at inmates.381 The Court also 
noted that the camp itself was shut down after an armed upris-
ing, which was led by kapos and guards at the time Fedorenko 
was there, but presumably without his assistance.382 
Fedorenko’s facts, in sum, fail to show the threat of imminent 
harm, the absence of alternatives, or proportionality in the 
harm caused. 
 
 375. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 526 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 376. Massey, supra note 16, at 130, 148. 
 377. Id. at 148–49. 
 378. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 511 (2009); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 
490 (1981). 
 379. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490 (1981). 
 380. Id. at 512. 
 381. Id. at 500, 512 & n.34, 513 & n.35. 
 382. Id. at 494. 
  
540 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:453 
 
In contrast, Negusie may be able to make out the duress 
defense. He was beaten and imprisoned and then forced to 
serve as an armed guard in the same military camp.383 He kept 
prisoners in the sun knowing it could lead to death but did not 
personally shoot at or punish anyone, and he offered assistance 
at times.384 After four years, he was able to escape only by 
swimming to a shipping container and hiding inside.385 
Negusie’s own persecution illustrates the presence of serious 
threats, the extreme measures required for escape indicates the 
lack of alternative choices, and the harm he caused to others 
appears to be the same as the harm threatened and imposed on 
him through his own persecution. 
Fedorenko compared the persecution exclusion to the ene-
my-operations exclusion in the IRO Constitution.386 Negusie 
compared the purpose of the Refugee Act to the purpose of the 
Displaced Persons Act.387 Simple comparisons, though, do not 
capture the complex history of the persecutor bar’s presence in 
U.S. immigration law for the past sixty-five years. Allowing a 
duress defense would recover this history, restore congressional 
intent, and draw the right lines. 
 
 383. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514–15; DHS Brief in In re Negusie at 3–8, 
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 512 (No. 07-499) (on file with the author). 
 384. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514–15. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490. 
 387. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 512. 
